Mark Vero

Slobodan Jenko, Niels Mündler, Jingxuan He et al. · eth-zurich

Modern code completion engines, powered by large language models (LLMs), assist millions of developers with their strong capabilities to generate functionally correct code. Due to this popularity, it is crucial to investigate the security implications of relying on LLM-based code completion. In this work, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art black-box LLM-based code completion engines can be stealthily biased by adversaries to significantly increase their rate of insecure code generation. We present the first attack, named INSEC, that achieves this goal. INSEC works by injecting an attack string as a short comment in the completion input. The attack string is crafted through a query-based optimization procedure starting from a set of carefully designed initialization schemes. We demonstrate INSEC's broad applicability and effectiveness by evaluating it on various state-of-the-art open-source models and black-box commercial services (e.g., OpenAI API and GitHub Copilot). On a diverse set of security-critical test cases, covering 16 CWEs across 5 programming languages, INSEC increases the rate of generated insecure code by more than 50%, while maintaining the functional correctness of generated code. We consider INSEC practical -- it requires low resources and costs less than 10 US dollars to develop on commodity hardware. Moreover, we showcase the attack's real-world deployability, by developing an IDE plug-in that stealthily injects INSEC into the GitHub Copilot extension.

Robin Staab, Mark Vero, Mislav Balunović et al.

Current privacy research on large language models (LLMs) primarily focuses on the issue of extracting memorized training data. At the same time, models' inference capabilities have increased drastically. This raises the key question of whether current LLMs could violate individuals' privacy by inferring personal attributes from text given at inference time. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study on the capabilities of pretrained LLMs to infer personal attributes from text. We construct a dataset consisting of real Reddit profiles, and show that current LLMs can infer a wide range of personal attributes (e.g., location, income, sex), achieving up to $85\%$ top-1 and $95\%$ top-3 accuracy at a fraction of the cost ($100\times$) and time ($240\times$) required by humans. As people increasingly interact with LLM-powered chatbots across all aspects of life, we also explore the emerging threat of privacy-invasive chatbots trying to extract personal information through seemingly benign questions. Finally, we show that common mitigations, i.e., text anonymization and model alignment, are currently ineffective at protecting user privacy against LLM inference. Our findings highlight that current LLMs can infer personal data at a previously unattainable scale. In the absence of working defenses, we advocate for a broader discussion around LLM privacy implications beyond memorization, striving for a wider privacy protection.

Thorir Mar Ingolfsson, Mark Vero, Xiaying Wang et al.

The computational demands of neural architecture search (NAS) algorithms are usually directly proportional to the size of their target search spaces. Thus, limiting the search to high-quality subsets can greatly reduce the computational load of NAS algorithms. In this paper, we present Clustering-Based REDuction (C-BRED), a new technique to reduce the size of NAS search spaces. C-BRED reduces a NAS space by clustering the computational graphs associated with its architectures and selecting the most promising cluster using proxy statistics correlated with network accuracy. When considering the NAS-Bench-201 (NB201) data set and the CIFAR-100 task, C-BRED selects a subset with 70% average accuracy instead of the whole space's 64% average accuracy.

Mark Vero, Mislav Balunović, Martin Vechev

Privacy, data quality, and data sharing concerns pose a key limitation for tabular data applications. While generating synthetic data resembling the original distribution addresses some of these issues, most applications would benefit from additional customization on the generated data. However, existing synthetic data approaches are limited to particular constraints, e.g., differential privacy (DP) or fairness. In this work, we introduce CuTS, the first customizable synthetic tabular data generation framework. Customization in CuTS is achieved via declarative statistical and logical expressions, supporting a wide range of requirements (e.g., DP or fairness, among others). To ensure high synthetic data quality in the presence of custom specifications, CuTS is pre-trained on the original dataset and fine-tuned on a differentiable loss automatically derived from the provided specifications using novel relaxations. We evaluate CuTS over four datasets and on numerous custom specifications, outperforming state-of-the-art specialized approaches on several tasks while being more general. In particular, at the same fairness level, we achieve 2.3% higher downstream accuracy than the state-of-the-art in fair synthetic data generation on the Adult dataset.

Mark Vero, Mislav Balunović, Dimitar I. Dimitrov et al.

While federated learning (FL) promises to preserve privacy, recent works in the image and text domains have shown that training updates leak private client data. However, most high-stakes applications of FL (e.g., in healthcare and finance) use tabular data, where the risk of data leakage has not yet been explored. A successful attack for tabular data must address two key challenges unique to the domain: (i) obtaining a solution to a high-variance mixed discrete-continuous optimization problem, and (ii) enabling human assessment of the reconstruction as unlike for image and text data, direct human inspection is not possible. In this work we address these challenges and propose TabLeak, the first comprehensive reconstruction attack on tabular data. TabLeak is based on two key contributions: (i) a method which leverages a softmax relaxation and pooled ensembling to solve the optimization problem, and (ii) an entropy-based uncertainty quantification scheme to enable human assessment. We evaluate TabLeak on four tabular datasets for both FedSGD and FedAvg training protocols, and show that it successfully breaks several settings previously deemed safe. For instance, we extract large subsets of private data at >90% accuracy even at the large batch size of 128. Our findings demonstrate that current high-stakes tabular FL is excessively vulnerable to leakage attacks.

Jingxuan He, Mark Vero, Gabriela Krasnopolska et al.

Modern language models (LMs) have gained widespread acceptance in everyday and professional contexts, particularly in programming. An essential procedure enabling this adoption is instruction tuning, which substantially enhances LMs' practical utility by training them to follow user instructions and human preferences. However, existing instruction tuning schemes overlook a crucial aspect: the security of generated code. As a result, even the state-of-the-art instruction-tuned LMs frequently produce unsafe code, posing significant security risks. In this work, we introduce SafeCoder to address this gap. SafeCoder performs security-centric fine-tuning using a diverse and high-quality dataset that we collected using an automated pipeline. We integrate the security fine-tuning with standard instruction tuning, to facilitate a joint optimization of both security and utility. Despite its simplicity, we show that SafeCoder is effective across a variety of popular LMs and datasets. It is able to drastically improve security (by about 30%), while preserving utility.

Robin Staab, Mark Vero, Mislav Balunović et al.

Recent privacy research on large language models (LLMs) has shown that they achieve near-human-level performance at inferring personal data from online texts. With ever-increasing model capabilities, existing text anonymization methods are currently lacking behind regulatory requirements and adversarial threats. In this work, we take two steps to bridge this gap: First, we present a new setting for evaluating anonymization in the face of adversarial LLM inferences, allowing for a natural measurement of anonymization performance while remedying some of the shortcomings of previous metrics. Then, within this setting, we develop a novel LLM-based adversarial anonymization framework leveraging the strong inferential capabilities of LLMs to inform our anonymization procedure. We conduct a comprehensive experimental evaluation of adversarial anonymization across 13 LLMs on real-world and synthetic online texts, comparing it against multiple baselines and industry-grade anonymizers. Our evaluation shows that adversarial anonymization outperforms current commercial anonymizers both in terms of the resulting utility and privacy. We support our findings with a human study (n=50) highlighting a strong and consistent human preference for LLM-anonymized texts.

Batuhan Tömekçe, Mark Vero, Robin Staab et al.

As large language models (LLMs) become ubiquitous in our daily tasks and digital interactions, associated privacy risks are increasingly in focus. While LLM privacy research has primarily focused on the leakage of model training data, it has recently been shown that LLMs can make accurate privacy-infringing inferences from previously unseen texts. With the rise of vision-language models (VLMs), capable of understanding both images and text, a key question is whether this concern transfers to the previously unexplored domain of benign images posted online. To answer this question, we compile an image dataset with human-annotated labels of the image owner's personal attributes. In order to understand the privacy risks posed by VLMs beyond traditional human attribute recognition, our dataset consists of images where the inferable private attributes do not stem from direct depictions of humans. On this dataset, we evaluate 7 state-of-the-art VLMs, finding that they can infer various personal attributes at up to 77.6% accuracy. Concerningly, we observe that accuracy scales with the general capabilities of the models, implying that future models can be misused as stronger inferential adversaries, establishing an imperative for the development of adequate defenses.

Mark Vero, Niels Mündler, Victor Chibotaru et al. · eth-zurich

Automatic program generation has long been a fundamental challenge in computer science. Recent benchmarks have shown that large language models (LLMs) can effectively generate code at the function level, make code edits, and solve algorithmic coding tasks. However, to achieve full automation, LLMs should be able to generate production-quality, self-contained application modules. To evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in solving this challenge, we introduce BaxBench, a novel evaluation benchmark consisting of 392 tasks for the generation of backend applications. We focus on backends for three critical reasons: (i) they are practically relevant, building the core components of most modern web and cloud software, (ii) they are difficult to get right, requiring multiple functions and files to achieve the desired functionality, and (iii) they are security-critical, as they are exposed to untrusted third-parties, making secure solutions that prevent deployment-time attacks an imperative. BaxBench validates the functionality of the generated applications with comprehensive test cases, and assesses their security exposure by executing end-to-end exploits. Our experiments reveal key limitations of current LLMs in both functionality and security: (i) even the best model, OpenAI o1, achieves a mere 62% on code correctness; (ii) on average, we could successfully execute security exploits on around half of the correct programs generated by each LLM; and (iii) in less popular backend frameworks, models further struggle to generate correct and secure applications. Progress on BaxBench signifies important steps towards autonomous and secure software development with LLMs.

Giovanni De Muri, Mark Vero, Robin Staab et al.

LLMs are often used by downstream users as teacher models for knowledge distillation, compressing their capabilities into memory-efficient models. However, as these teacher models may stem from untrusted parties, distillation can raise unexpected security risks. In this paper, we investigate the security implications of knowledge distillation from backdoored teacher models. First, we show that prior backdoors mostly do not transfer onto student models. Our key insight is that this is because existing LLM backdooring methods choose trigger tokens that rarely occur in usual contexts. We argue that this underestimates the security risks of knowledge distillation and introduce a new backdooring technique, T-MTB, that enables the construction and study of transferable backdoors. T-MTB carefully constructs a composite backdoor trigger, made up of several specific tokens that often occur individually in anticipated distillation datasets. As such, the poisoned teacher remains stealthy, while during distillation the individual presence of these tokens provides enough signal for the backdoor to transfer onto the student. Using T-MTB, we demonstrate and extensively study the security risks of transferable backdoors across two attack scenarios, jailbreaking and content modulation, and across four model families of LLMs.

Kazuki Egashira, Robin Staab, Thibaud Gloaguen et al.

Model pruning, i.e., removing a subset of model weights, has become a prominent approach to reducing the memory footprint of large language models (LLMs) during inference. Notably, popular inference engines, such as vLLM, enable users to conveniently prune downloaded models before they are deployed. While the utility and efficiency of pruning methods have improved significantly, the security implications of pruning remain underexplored. In this work, for the first time, we show that modern LLM pruning methods can be maliciously exploited. In particular, an adversary can construct a model that appears benign yet, once pruned, exhibits malicious behaviors. Our method is based on the idea that the adversary can compute a proxy metric that estimates how likely each parameter is to be pruned. With this information, the adversary can first inject a malicious behavior into those parameters that are unlikely to be pruned. Then, they can repair the model by using parameters that are likely to be pruned, effectively canceling out the injected behavior in the unpruned model. We demonstrate the severity of our attack through extensive evaluation on five models; after any of the pruning in vLLM are applied (Magnitude, Wanda, and SparseGPT), it consistently exhibits strong malicious behaviors in a diverse set of attack scenarios (success rates of up to $95.7\%$ for jailbreak, $98.7\%$ for benign instruction refusal, and $99.5\%$ for targeted content injection). Our results reveal a critical deployment-time security gap and underscore the urgent need for stronger security awareness in model compression.

Kazuki Egashira, Robin Staab, Mark Vero et al.

With the increasing size of frontier LLMs, post-training quantization has become the standard for memory-efficient deployment. Recent work has shown that basic rounding-based quantization schemes pose security risks, as they can be exploited to inject malicious behaviors into quantized models that remain hidden in full precision. However, existing attacks cannot be applied to more complex quantization methods, such as the GGUF family used in the popular ollama and llama$.$cpp frameworks. In this work, we address this gap by introducing the first attack on GGUF. Our key insight is that the quantization error -- the difference between the full-precision weights and their (de-)quantized version -- provides sufficient flexibility to construct malicious quantized models that appear benign in full precision. Leveraging this, we develop an attack that trains the target malicious LLM while constraining its weights based on quantization errors. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on three popular LLMs across nine GGUF quantization data types on three diverse attack scenarios: insecure code generation ($Δ$=$88.7\%$), targeted content injection ($Δ$=$85.0\%$), and benign instruction refusal ($Δ$=$30.1\%$). Our attack highlights that (1) the most widely used post-training quantization method is susceptible to adversarial interferences, and (2) the complexity of quantization schemes alone is insufficient as a defense.

Hanna Yukhymenko, Robin Staab, Mark Vero et al.

Recently, powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) have become easily accessible to hundreds of millions of users world-wide. However, their strong capabilities and vast world knowledge do not come without associated privacy risks. In this work, we focus on the emerging privacy threat LLMs pose -- the ability to accurately infer personal information from online texts. Despite the growing importance of LLM-based author profiling, research in this area has been hampered by a lack of suitable public datasets, largely due to ethical and privacy concerns associated with real personal data. We take two steps to address this problem: (i) we construct a simulation framework for the popular social media platform Reddit using LLM agents seeded with synthetic personal profiles; (ii) using this framework, we generate SynthPAI, a diverse synthetic dataset of over 7800 comments manually labeled for personal attributes. We validate our dataset with a human study showing that humans barely outperform random guessing on the task of distinguishing our synthetic comments from real ones. Further, we verify that our dataset enables meaningful personal attribute inference research by showing across 18 state-of-the-art LLMs that our synthetic comments allow us to draw the same conclusions as real-world data. Combined, our experimental results, dataset and pipeline form a strong basis for future privacy-preserving research geared towards understanding and mitigating inference-based privacy threats that LLMs pose.