George Koomullil

2papers

2 Papers

27.7AIApr 20
Formally Verified Patent Analysis via Dependent Type Theory: Machine-Checkable Certificates from a Hybrid AI + Lean 4 Pipeline

George Koomullil

We present a formally verified framework for patent analysis as a hybrid AI + Lean 4 pipeline. The DAG-coverage core (Algorithm 1b) is fully machine-verified once bounded match scores are fixed. Freedom-to-operate, claim-construction sensitivity, cross-claim consistency, and doctrine-of-equivalents analyses are formalized at the specification level with kernel-checked candidate certificates. Existing patent-analysis approaches rely on manual expert analysis (slow, non-scalable) or ML/NLP methods (probabilistic, opaque, non-compositional). To our knowledge, this is the first framework that applies interactive theorem proving based on dependent type theory to intellectual property analysis. Claims are encoded as DAGs in Lean 4, match strengths as elements of a verified complete lattice, and confidence scores propagate through dependencies via proven-correct monotone functions. We formalize five IP use cases (patent-to-product mapping, freedom-to-operate, claim construction sensitivity, cross-claim consistency, doctrine of equivalents) via six algorithms. Structural lemmas, the coverage-core generator, and the closed-path identity coverage = W_cov are machine-verified in Lean 4. Higher-level theorems for the other use cases remain informal proof sketches, and their proof-generation functions are architecturally mitigated (untrusted generators whose outputs are kernel-checked and sorry-free axiom-audited). Guarantees are conditional on the ML layer: they certify mathematical correctness of computations downstream of ML scores, not the accuracy of the scores themselves. A case study on a synthetic memory-module claim demonstrates weighted coverage and construction-sensitivity analysis. Validation against adjudicated cases is future work.

12.0LOMay 13
Proof-Carrying Certificates for LLM Pipelines: A Trust-Boundary Architecture

George Koomullil

We present a framework for verifying the deterministic structured computations surrounding a large language model rather than the model itself, extending a Lean 4 trust-boundary architecture to the generic interfaces of modern LLM pipelines. Certificate validity is a Lean 4 kernel type-check plus a sorry-free transitive axiom audit against the trusted set {propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound}; other assumptions are declared and partitioned by tier (mathematical placeholders, cryptographic assumptions, ML/human oracles). The technical contribution comprises three local certificate families and two operators. The families are conflict-aware bilattice grounding (with an emission-gate soundness lemma), embedding sensitivity and paraphrase stability, and Hoare-style agent action. The operators are a Maximal Certifiable Residue, which turns abstention into the maximum-weight certifiable residue with audit-logged dropped claims, and a Compositional Stability theorem, which yields a closed-form pipeline-wide perturbation budget from per-layer gains and margins. The three families plus a Universal Assurance Card consolidator form the per-call deliverable for high-stakes deployments: patent and legal retrieval, regulated finance, clinical decision support, and agentic systems with irreversible side effects. A compiled Lean 4 reference artifact (Lean v4.30.0-rc2, Mathlib) covers all 22 certificate types, with 17 of 46 kernel-audited declarations axiom-free, the rest depending only on the trusted set and declared assumptions, and zero uses of sorryAx or Lean.ofReduceBool. The three families are empirically tested through four registered pilots: bilattice grounding on adversarially perturbed HotpotQA, embedding sensitivity in short- and long-form settings, and Hoare-style agent action on a filesystem sandbox with adversarial prompt injection.