Amy B. Cyphert

A. Feder Cooper, Aaron Gokaslan, Ahmed Ahmed et al.

Plaintiffs and defendants in copyright lawsuits over generative AI often make sweeping, opposing claims about the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have memorized plaintiffs' protected expression in their training data. Drawing on both machine learning and copyright law, we show that these polarized positions dramatically oversimplify the relationship between memorization and copyright. To do so, we extend a recent probabilistic extraction technique to measure memorization of 50 books in 17 open-weight LLMs. Through thousands of experiments, we show that the extent of memorization varies both by model and by book. With respect to our specific extraction methodology, we find that most LLMs do not memorize most books -- either in whole or in part. However, we also find that Llama 3.1 70B entirely memorizes some books, like the first Harry Potter book and 1984. In fact, the first Harry Potter is so memorized that, using a seed prompt consisting of just the first few tokens of the first chapter, we can deterministically generate the entire book near-verbatim. We discuss why our results have significant implications for copyright cases, though not ones that unambiguously favor either side.

A. Feder Cooper, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Miranda Bogen et al. · deepmind

"Machine unlearning" is a popular proposed solution for mitigating the existence of content in an AI model that is problematic for legal or moral reasons, including privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of specific information from a generative-AI model's parameters, e.g., a particular individual's personal data or the inclusion of copyrighted content in the model's training data. Unlearning is also proposed as a way to prevent a model from generating targeted types of information in its outputs, e.g., generations that closely resemble a particular individual's data or reflect the concept of "Spiderman." Both of these goals--the targeted removal of information from a model and the targeted suppression of information from a model's outputs--present various technical and substantive challenges. We provide a framework for ML researchers and policymakers to think rigorously about these challenges, identifying several mismatches between the goals of unlearning and feasible implementations. These mismatches explain why unlearning is not a general-purpose solution for circumscribing generative-AI model behavior in service of broader positive impact.