Mark A. Lemley

Peter Henderson, Xuechen Li, Dan Jurafsky et al. · stanford

Existing foundation models are trained on copyrighted material. Deploying these models can pose both legal and ethical risks when data creators fail to receive appropriate attribution or compensation. In the United States and several other countries, copyrighted content may be used to build foundation models without incurring liability due to the fair use doctrine. However, there is a caveat: If the model produces output that is similar to copyrighted data, particularly in scenarios that affect the market of that data, fair use may no longer apply to the output of the model. In this work, we emphasize that fair use is not guaranteed, and additional work may be necessary to keep model development and deployment squarely in the realm of fair use. First, we survey the potential risks of developing and deploying foundation models based on copyrighted content. We review relevant U.S. case law, drawing parallels to existing and potential applications for generating text, source code, and visual art. Experiments confirm that popular foundation models can generate content considerably similar to copyrighted material. Second, we discuss technical mitigations that can help foundation models stay in line with fair use. We argue that more research is needed to align mitigation strategies with the current state of the law. Lastly, we suggest that the law and technical mitigations should co-evolve. For example, coupled with other policy mechanisms, the law could more explicitly consider safe harbors when strong technical tools are used to mitigate infringement harms. This co-evolution may help strike a balance between intellectual property and innovation, which speaks to the original goal of fair use. But we emphasize that the strategies we describe here are not a panacea and more work is needed to develop policies that address the potential harms of foundation models.

A. Feder Cooper, Mark A. Lemley, Christopher De Sa et al.

Recent work shows that standard greedy-decoding extraction methods for quantifying memorization in LLMs miss how extraction risk varies across sequences. Probabilistic extraction -- computing the probability of generating a target suffix given a prefix under a decoding scheme -- addresses this, but is tractable only for verbatim memorization, missing near-verbatim instances that pose similar privacy and copyright risks. Quantifying near-verbatim extraction risk is expensive: the set of near-verbatim suffixes is combinatorially large, and reliable Monte Carlo (MC) estimation can require ~100,000 samples per sequence. To mitigate this cost, we introduce decoding-constrained beam search, which yields deterministic lower bounds on near-verbatim extraction risk at a cost comparable to ~20 MC samples per sequence. Across experiments, our approach surfaces information invisible to verbatim methods: many more extractable sequences, substantially larger per-sequence extraction mass, and patterns in how near-verbatim extraction risk manifests across model sizes and types of text.

A. Feder Cooper, Aaron Gokaslan, Ahmed Ahmed et al.

Plaintiffs and defendants in copyright lawsuits over generative AI often make sweeping, opposing claims about the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have memorized plaintiffs' protected expression in their training data. Drawing on both machine learning and copyright law, we show that these polarized positions dramatically oversimplify the relationship between memorization and copyright. To do so, we extend a recent probabilistic extraction technique to measure memorization of 50 books in 17 open-weight LLMs. Through thousands of experiments, we show that the extent of memorization varies both by model and by book. With respect to our specific extraction methodology, we find that most LLMs do not memorize most books -- either in whole or in part. However, we also find that Llama 3.1 70B entirely memorizes some books, like the first Harry Potter book and 1984. In fact, the first Harry Potter is so memorized that, using a seed prompt consisting of just the first few tokens of the first chapter, we can deterministically generate the entire book near-verbatim. We discuss why our results have significant implications for copyright cases, though not ones that unambiguously favor either side.

Peter Henderson, Mark A. Lemley

Artificial intelligence (AI) model creators commonly attach restrictive terms of use to both their models and their outputs. These terms typically prohibit activities ranging from creating competing AI models to spreading disinformation. Often taken at face value, these terms are positioned by companies as key enforceable tools for preventing misuse, particularly in policy dialogs. But are these terms truly meaningful? There are myriad examples where these broad terms are regularly and repeatedly violated. Yet except for some account suspensions on platforms, no model creator has actually tried to enforce these terms with monetary penalties or injunctive relief. This is likely for good reason: we think that the legal enforceability of these licenses is questionable. This Article systematically assesses of the enforceability of AI model terms of use and offers three contributions. First, we pinpoint a key problem: the artifacts that they protect, namely model weights and model outputs, are largely not copyrightable, making it unclear whether there is even anything to be licensed. Second, we examine the problems this creates for other enforcement. Recent doctrinal trends in copyright preemption may further undermine state-law claims, while other legal frameworks like the DMCA and CFAA offer limited recourse. Anti-competitive provisions likely fare even worse than responsible use provisions. Third, we provide recommendations to policymakers. There are compelling reasons for many provisions to be unenforceable: they chill good faith research, constrain competition, and create quasi-copyright ownership where none should exist. There are, of course, downsides: model creators have fewer tools to prevent harmful misuse. But we think the better approach is for statutory provisions, not private fiat, to distinguish between good and bad uses of AI, restricting the latter.

A. Feder Cooper, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Miranda Bogen et al. · deepmind

"Machine unlearning" is a popular proposed solution for mitigating the existence of content in an AI model that is problematic for legal or moral reasons, including privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of specific information from a generative-AI model's parameters, e.g., a particular individual's personal data or the inclusion of copyrighted content in the model's training data. Unlearning is also proposed as a way to prevent a model from generating targeted types of information in its outputs, e.g., generations that closely resemble a particular individual's data or reflect the concept of "Spiderman." Both of these goals--the targeted removal of information from a model and the targeted suppression of information from a model's outputs--present various technical and substantive challenges. We provide a framework for ML researchers and policymakers to think rigorously about these challenges, identifying several mismatches between the goals of unlearning and feasible implementations. These mismatches explain why unlearning is not a general-purpose solution for circumscribing generative-AI model behavior in service of broader positive impact.