3 Papers

CRApr 23
A Stackelberg Model for Hybridization in Cryptography

Willie Kouam, Stefan Rass, Zahra Seyedi et al.

Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one attempting to decrypt it, generally for malicious purposes, is the attacker. To strengthen security in cryptography, various strategies have been developed, among which hybridization stands out as a key concept in modern cryptographic design. This strategy allows the defender to select among different encryption algorithms (classical, post-quantum, or hybrid) while carefully balancing security and operational costs. On the other side, the attacker, limited by available resources, chooses cryptanalysis methods capable of breaching the selected algorithm. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg cryptographic hybridization problem under resource constraints. Here, the defender randomizes over encryption algorithms, and the attacker observes the choice before selecting suitable cryptanalysis methods. The attacker's decision is framed as a conditional optimization problem, which we refer to as the ``attacker subgame''. We then propose a dynamic programming approach for the attacker's subgame, while the defender's Stackelberg optimization is formulated as a linear program.

GTMay 5
Decentralized Edge Caching under Budget and Storage Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Hamta Sedghani, Zahra Seyedi, Mauro Passacantando et al.

The rapid growth of mobile social networks (MSNs) has significantly increased the demand for low-latency and reliable content delivery, motivating the deployment of edge caching systems. In practice, multiple content providers (CPs) compete for the limited storage resources of edge devices (EDs), while facing heterogeneous budgets and operational costs. This paper investigates a decentralized multi-CP edge caching framework that jointly accounts for CP budget constraints, ED storage limitations, and strategic interactions among all entities. We formulate the interaction between CPs and EDs as a hierarchical game, combining a Stackelberg model for CP-ED interactions with a non-cooperative game among competing CPs. Under light storage constraints, we show that CP competition constitutes an exact potential game, ensuring the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and enabling decentralized convergence. When storage constraints are binding, the resulting game loses this structure; nevertheless, extensive simulations demonstrate stable and efficient convergence in practice. Through a comprehensive numerical evaluation, we show that convergence behavior is primarily driven by CP competition rather than the scale of edge infrastructure. We further reveal that storage scarcity fundamentally alters economic outcomes, amplifying inequality among CPs while increasing the relative bargaining power of EDs. The proposed framework provides a scalable and economically grounded solution for decentralized resource allocation in multi-provider edge caching systems.

CRMay 3
Plausible Deniability in Fully Homomorphic Computation

Shahzad Ahmad, Stefan Rass, Zahra Seyedi

We introduce \emph{Plausible Deniability in Fully Homomorphic Computation} (PD-FHC), a framework enabling users to outsource Boolean computations to an untrusted cloud while maintaining both computational privacy against honest-but-curious providers and plausible deniability against coercive adversaries. We define the notion of a \emph{Deniable Computation Medium} (DCM) and a \emph{Deniable Computation Scheme} (DCS) as medium-independent abstractions, then instantiate them using RGB images with Fredkin-gate circuits. Multiple computation scenarios (one real, several decoys) are embedded at secret positions within cover images; the cloud applies identical operations to every pixel, processing all scenarios uniformly. Under coercion, the user reveals a decoy computation with verifiable results while the real computation remains hidden. We formalize multi-round coercion games with existence and intent distinguishing advantages, proving computational privacy with advantage $Θ(1/(n-1)!)$ and negligible existence-hiding advantage for the image instantiation. Our Python implementation, benchmarked across circuit sizes (5--289 gates) and image dimensions ($128^2$ to $512^2$), demonstrates competitive performance with TFHE for Boolean circuits while providing deniability that FHE fundamentally cannot offer.