CRMar 6, 2023
ALMOST: Adversarial Learning to Mitigate Oracle-less ML Attacks via Synthesis TuningAnimesh Basak Chowdhury, Lilas Alrahis, Luca Collini et al.
Oracle-less machine learning (ML) attacks have broken various logic locking schemes. Regular synthesis, which is tailored for area-power-delay optimization, yields netlists where key-gate localities are vulnerable to learning. Thus, we call for security-aware logic synthesis. We propose ALMOST, a framework for adversarial learning to mitigate oracle-less ML attacks via synthesis tuning. ALMOST uses a simulated-annealing-based synthesis recipe generator, employing adversarially trained models that can predict state-of-the-art attacks' accuracies over wide ranges of recipes and key-gate localities. Experiments on ISCAS benchmarks confirm the attacks' accuracies drops to around 50\% for ALMOST-synthesized circuits, all while not undermining design optimization.
77.7ARApr 11
VeriInteresting: An Empirical Study of Model Prompt Interactions in Verilog Code GenerationLuca Collini, Andrew Hennesee, Patrick Yubeaton et al.
Rapid advances in language models (LMs) have created new opportunities for automated code generation while complicating trade-offs between model characteristics and prompt design choices. In this work, we provide an empirical map of recent trends in LMs for Verilog code generation, focusing on interactions among model reasoning, specialization, and prompt engineering strategies. We evaluate a diverse set of small and large LMs, including general-purpose, reasoning, and domain-specific variants. Our experiments use a controlled factorial design spanning benchmark prompts, structured outputs, prompt rewriting, chain-of-thought reasoning, in-context learning, and evolutionary prompt optimization via Genetic-Pareto. Across two Verilog benchmarks, we identify patterns in how model classes respond to structured prompts and optimization, and we document which trends generalize across LMs and benchmarks versus those that are specific to particular model-prompt combinations.
AIMar 17, 2025Code
Can Reasoning Models Reason about Hardware? An Agentic HLS PerspectiveLuca Collini, Andrew Hennessee, Ramesh Karri et al.
Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) such as OpenAI o3-mini and DeepSeek-R1 use enhanced reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT). Their potential in hardware design, which relies on expert-driven iterative optimization, remains unexplored. This paper investigates whether reasoning LLMs can address challenges in High-Level Synthesis (HLS) design space exploration and optimization. During HLS, engineers manually define pragmas/directives to balance performance and resource constraints. We propose an LLM-based optimization agentic framework that automatically restructures code, inserts pragmas, and identifies optimal design points via feedback from HLs tools and access to integer-linear programming (ILP) solvers. Experiments compare reasoning models against conventional LLMs on benchmarks using success rate, efficiency, and design quality (area/latency) metrics, and provide the first-ever glimpse into the CoTs produced by a powerful open-source reasoning model like DeepSeek-R1.
CRMay 17, 2025
MARVEL: Multi-Agent RTL Vulnerability Extraction using Large Language ModelsLuca Collini, Baleegh Ahmad, Joey Ah-kiow et al.
Hardware security verification is a challenging and time-consuming task. For this purpose, design engineers may utilize tools such as formal verification, linters, and functional simulation tests, coupled with analysis and a deep understanding of the hardware design being inspected. Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to assist during this task, either directly or in conjunction with existing tools. We improve the state of the art by proposing MARVEL, a multi-agent LLM framework for a unified approach to decision-making, tool use, and reasoning. MARVEL mimics the cognitive process of a designer looking for security vulnerabilities in RTL code. It consists of a supervisor agent that devises the security policy of the system-on-chips (SoCs) using its security documentation. It delegates tasks to validate the security policy to individual executor agents. Each executor agent carries out its assigned task using a particular strategy. Each executor agent may use one or more tools to identify potential security bugs in the design and send the results back to the supervisor agent for further analysis and confirmation. MARVEL includes executor agents that leverage formal tools, linters, simulation tests, LLM-based detection schemes, and static analysis-based checks. We test our approach on a known buggy SoC based on OpenTitan from the Hack@DATE competition. We find that 20 of the 48 issues reported by MARVEL pose security vulnerabilities.
ARMay 20, 2021
Optimizing the Use of Behavioral Locking for High-Level SynthesisChristian Pilato, Luca Collini, Luca Cassano et al.
The globalization of the electronics supply chain requires effective methods to thwart reverse engineering and IP theft. Logic locking is a promising solution, but there are many open concerns. First, even when applied at a higher level of abstraction, locking may result in significant overhead without improving the security metric. Second, optimizing a security metric is application-dependent and designers must evaluate and compare alternative solutions. We propose a meta-framework to optimize the use of behavioral locking during the high-level synthesis (HLS) of IP cores. Our method operates on chip's specification (before HLS) and it is compatible with all HLS tools, complementing industrial EDA flows. Our meta-framework supports different strategies to explore the design space and to select points to be locked automatically. We evaluated our method on the optimization of differential entropy, achieving better results than random or topological locking: 1) we always identify a valid solution that optimizes the security metric, while topological and random locking can generate unfeasible solutions; 2) we minimize the number of bits used for locking up to more than 90% (requiring smaller tamper-proof memories); 3) we make better use of hardware resources since we obtain similar overheads but with higher security metric.