Weiran Shen

Hongtao Liu, Zhicheng Du, Zihe Wang et al.

Game-playing ability serves as an indicator for evaluating the strategic reasoning capability of large language models (LLMs). While most existing studies rely on utility performance metrics, which are not robust enough due to variations in opponent behavior and game structure. To address this limitation, we propose \textbf{Cognitive Hierarchy Benchmark (CHBench)}, a novel evaluation framework inspired by the cognitive hierarchy models from behavioral economics. We hypothesize that agents have bounded rationality -- different agents behave at varying reasoning depths/levels. We evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning through a three-phase systematic framework, utilizing behavioral data from six state-of-the-art LLMs across fifteen carefully selected normal-form games. Experiments show that LLMs exhibit consistent strategic reasoning levels across diverse opponents, confirming the framework's robustness and generalization capability. We also analyze the effects of two key mechanisms (Chat Mechanism and Memory Mechanism) on strategic reasoning performance. Results indicate that the Chat Mechanism significantly degrades strategic reasoning, whereas the Memory Mechanism enhances it. These insights position CHBench as a promising tool for evaluating LLM capabilities, with significant potential for future research and practical applications.

Lijun Liu, Jiali Yang, Jianfei Song et al.

Recombinant adeno-associated virus (rAAV) vectors have revolutionized gene therapy, but their broad tropism and suboptimal transduction efficiency limit their clinical applications. To overcome these limitations, researchers have focused on designing and screening capsid libraries to identify improved vectors. However, the large sequence space and limited resources present challenges in identifying viable capsid variants. In this study, we propose an end-to-end diffusion model to generate capsid sequences with enhanced viability. Using publicly available AAV2 data, we generated 38,000 diverse AAV2 viral protein (VP) sequences, and evaluated 8,000 for viral selection. The results attested the superiority of our model compared to traditional methods. Additionally, in the absence of AAV9 capsid data, apart from one wild-type sequence, we used the same model to directly generate a number of viable sequences with up to 9 mutations. we transferred the remaining 30,000 samples to the AAV9 domain. Furthermore, we conducted mutagenesis on AAV9 VP hypervariable regions VI and V, contributing to the continuous improvement of the AAV9 VP sequence. This research represents a significant advancement in the design and functional validation of rAAV vectors, offering innovative solutions to enhance specificity and transduction efficiency in gene therapy applications.

Weiran Shen, Sébastien Lahaie, Renato Paes Leme

The problem of market clearing is to set a price for an item such that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. In this work, we cast the problem of predicting clearing prices into a learning framework and use the resulting models to perform revenue optimization in auctions and markets with contextual information. The economic intuition behind market clearing allows us to obtain fine-grained control over the aggressiveness of the resulting pricing policy, grounded in theory. To evaluate our approach, we fit a model of clearing prices over a massive dataset of bids in display ad auctions from a major ad exchange. The learned prices outperform other modeling techniques in the literature in terms of revenue and efficiency trade-offs. Because of the convex nature of the clearing loss function, the convergence rate of our method is as fast as linear regression.

Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo

Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Previous approaches that attempt to design revenue optimal auctions for the multi-dimensional settings fall short in at least one of the three aspects: 1) representation -- search in a space that probably does not even contain the optimal mechanism; 2) exactness -- finding a mechanism that is either not truthful or far from optimal; 3) domain dependence -- need a different design for different environment settings. To resolve the three difficulties, in this paper, we put forward -- MenuNet -- a unified neural network based framework that automatically learns to design revenue optimal mechanisms. Our framework consists of a mechanism network that takes an input distribution for training and outputs a mechanism, as well as a buyer network that takes a mechanism as input and output an action. Such a separation in design mitigates the difficulty to impose incentive compatibility constraints on the mechanism, by making it a rational choice of the buyer. As a result, our framework easily overcomes the previously mentioned difficulty in incorporating IC constraints and always returns exactly incentive compatible mechanisms. We then apply our framework to a number of multi-item revenue optimal design settings, for a few of which the theoretically optimal mechanisms are unknown. We then go on to theoretically prove that the mechanisms found by our framework are indeed optimal. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply neural networks to discover optimal auction mechanisms with provable optimality.

Mengjing Chen, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang et al.

Over the past few years, ride-sharing has emerged as an effective way to relieve traffic congestion. A key problem for these platforms is to come up with a revenue-optimal (or GMV-optimal) pricing scheme and an induced vehicle dispatching policy that incorporate geographic and temporal information. In this paper, we aim to tackle this problem via an economic approach. Modeled naively, the underlying optimization problem may be non-convex and thus hard to compute. To this end, we use a so-called "ironing" technique to convert the problem into an equivalent convex optimization one via a clean Markov decision process (MDP) formulation, where the states are the driver distributions and the decision variables are the prices for each pair of locations. Our main finding is an efficient algorithm that computes the exact revenue-optimal (or GMV-optimal) randomized pricing schemes. We characterize the optimal solution of the MDP by a primal-dual analysis of a corresponding convex program. We also conduct empirical evaluations of our solution through real data of a major ride-sharing platform and show its advantages over fixed pricing schemes as well as several prevalent surge-based pricing schemes.