Irene Aldridge

Irene Aldridge

We develop a game-theoretic framework that compares welfare efficiency across three market mechanisms: continuous double auctions with transparent order books (lit exchanges), opaque order books (dark pools), and periodic batch auctions. Each mechanism is modeled as a queuing system where heterogeneous traders face trade-offs between the execution price, waiting costs, and transaction costs. Our main result establishes that under moderate arrival rates and bounded adverse selection, dark pools dominate both alternatives in aggregate ex-ante welfare. Observable order books create costly strategic timing games in which traders delay or rush submissions to optimize their position in the queue, generating wasteful social waiting costs. Opaque order books eliminate these timing games through information design. We formally characterize the equilibrium strategies in each mechanism and prove the welfare ranking $W^{DARK} > W^{LIT} > W^{BATCH}$. Extensions incorporate asymmetric information and endogenous venue choice. The results demonstrate how the information structure and the discipline of the service jointly determine efficiency in strategic matching environments.

Irene Aldridge

This paper proposes a computationally efficient mechanism for multi-dimensional matching markets where agents report preferences over object features rather than complete utility assessments. We use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to identify the principal direction of variation in feature space and match agents to objects along this dimension, reducing a complex multi-dimensional problem to an effectively one-dimensional problem solvable in $O(N \log N)$ time. We show that when data exhibit low effective dimensionality, our mechanism approximately maximizes Nash Social Welfare, satisfies distributional truthfulness, and achieves symmetry. We establish a novel connection between Nash Social Welfare and Geometric Distributionally Robust Optimization, providing robustness guaranties. Numerical experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves 99\% optimal welfare while running three orders of magnitude faster than direct optimization. The framework applies naturally to school choice, labor markets, and course allocation, where feature-based elicitation reduces the cognitive burden on agents.

Irene Aldridge

Regret is the cost of uncertainty in algorithmic decision-making. Quantifying regret typically requires computationally expensive simulation via Sample Average Approximation (SAA), with complexity $\mathcal{O}(Bn^{2}d^{3})$ in the number of scenarios $B$, variables $n$, and constraints $d$. % This paper proves that expected regret in any stochastic optimization problem admits the exact decomposition % \begin{equation*} \mathrm{Regret}(c) = \mathrm{Cov}(c,\,π^{*}(c)) + R(c), \end{equation*} % where $c$ is the vector of uncertain parameters, $π^{*}(c)$ is the optimal decision, and $R(c)$ is a residual whose magnitude we bound explicitly under Lipschitz, smooth, and strongly convex conditions. % For linear programs and unconstrained quadratic programs, including the classical Markowitz portfolio problem, we prove $R(c)=0$ exactly, so that $\mathrm{Regret}(c) = \mathrm{Cov}(c,π^{*}(c))$ holds without approximation. % When historical cost-decision pairs $\{(c_i, π^*(c_i))\}$ are available, the covariance can be estimated in $\mathcal{O}(nd^{2})$ time, which is orders of magnitude faster than SAA. The estimation is performed by a single pass through the data. % We derive concentration bounds, a central limit theorem, and an asymptotically unbiased residual estimator, and we validate all results on synthetic LP, QP, and integer programming instances and on a rolling-window portfolio experiment using ten years of CRSP equity data.

Irene Aldridge, Ellie Bae, Siddhesh Darak et al.

Municipal 311 call centers and complaint intake systems face a structural mismatch between incoming volume and classification capacity. The staff and heuristics available to triage, route, and prioritize complaints cannot scale with demand. This bottleneck produces differential service quality that follows income and racial lines (\cite{liu2024sla}). We develop an equity-centered reinforcement learning (RL) framework that augments call classification capacity across six New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) operational domains: boiler safety, crane and derrick oversight, heat and hot water complaints, housing complaint triage, scaffold safety, and Natural Area District (SNAD) protection. Rather than replacing human classifiers, our agents act as intelligent intake routers: learning to assign incoming complaints to action categories: escalate, batch, defer, inspect now. The proposed technique is designed to maximize throughput, minimize misclassification cost, and actively narrow historical equity gaps in service delivery. We formalize each domain as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) in which equitable classification coverage is a first-class reward objective. Post-hoc SHAP attribution reveals that complaint recurrence and neighborhood-level statistics are stronger predictors of actionable violations than raw complaint volume. This finding has direct implications for complaint routing given the demographic correlates of those features.

Irene Aldridge

This paper proposes an eigenvalue-based small-sample approximation of the celebrated Markov Chain Monte Carlo that delivers an invariant steady-state distribution that is consistent with traditional Monte Carlo methods. The proposed eigenvalue-based methodology reduces the number of paths required for Monte Carlo from as many as 1,000,000 to as few as 10 (depending on the simulation time horizon $T$), and delivers comparable, distributionally robust results, as measured by the Wasserstein distance. The proposed methodology also produces a significant variance reduction in the steady-state distribution.

Irene Aldridge

This paper examines the computational complexity of the \emph{Core Identification Problem} (CIP) in one-sided matching markets governed by the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm. The central contribution is a formal complexity separation: this paper proves that identifying which agents receive a core allocation is strictly easier than computing the full TTC allocation. Specifically, we show that CIP can be solved in $\bigO{Ln}$ time, where $L$ is the maximum number of preferences reported per agent, by computing the leading eigenvector of a preference-derived Markov transition matrix via randomized SVD\@. For sparse preference profiles ($L = \bigO{1}$, as in the NYC school choice where $L = 12$), this yields an algorithm $\bigO{n}$. This result strictly improves on the $\bigO{n \log n}$ complexity of the full TTC allocation (\cite{SabanSethuraman2013}) and matches the $\Omg{n}$ information-theoretic lower bound, establishing asymptotic optimality. The method inherits all properties of TTC: Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness, and is robust to preference noise for sufficiently large~$n$.