Maurice Chiodo

CY
h-index8
3papers
13citations
Novelty22%
AI Score30

3 Papers

CRApr 21
"We are currently clean on OPSEC": Why JD Can't Encrypt

Maurice Chiodo, Toni Erskine, Dennis Müller et al.

We analyse the 2025 Signalgate leak of sensitive US military information by the Trump administration, addressing why confidentiality was violated (messages leaked to the press) in spite of encryption (Signal), to deepen the socio-technical considerations when designing and deploying encryption. First, we use applied pi-calculus to formally model the boutique secure facility setup requested by the US Defence Secretary, to prove that a leak would not be prevented. We then examine how using a secure channel might still not give overall information security, as, in this case, power imbalances between personnel and officials led to the application of cryptography that compromised their operational security. We look at how cryptographic tools may have instilled a false sense of security, and led officials to "overshare". We then apply this analysis to the Trump administration's general desire to burn through political, legal, and now technical process, and demonstrate geopolitical harms that may arise from such ineffective use of cryptography in a brief use case. We conclude that, even with advancements in usability of cryptographic tools, genuine message security is still out of reach of the "average user".

CYMay 15, 2025
Formalising Human-in-the-Loop: Computational Reductions, Failure Modes, and Legal-Moral Responsibility

Maurice Chiodo, Dennis Müller, Paul Siewert et al.

We use the notion of oracle machines and reductions from computability theory to formalise different Human-in-the-loop (HITL) setups for AI systems, distinguishing between trivial human monitoring (i.e., total functions), single endpoint human action (i.e., many-one reductions), and highly involved human-AI interaction (i.e., Turing reductions). We then proceed to show that the legal status and safety of different setups vary greatly. We present a taxonomy to categorise HITL failure modes, highlighting the practical limitations of HITL setups. We then identify omissions in UK and EU legal frameworks, which focus on HITL setups that may not always achieve the desired ethical, legal, and sociotechnical outcomes. We suggest areas where the law should recognise the effectiveness of different HITL setups and assign responsibility in these contexts, avoiding human "scapegoating". Our work shows an unavoidable trade-off between attribution of legal responsibility, and technical explainability. Overall, we show how HITL setups involve many technical design decisions, and can be prone to failures out of the humans' control. Our formalisation and taxonomy opens up a new analytic perspective on the challenges in creating HITL setups, helping inform AI developers and lawmakers on designing HITL setups to better achieve their desired outcomes.

CYJan 12, 2025
Integrators at War: Mediating in AI-assisted Resort-to-Force Decisions

Dennis Müller, Maurice Chiodo, Mitja Sienknecht

The integration of AI systems into the military domain is changing the way war-related decisions are made. It binds together three disparate groups of actors - developers, integrators, users - and creates a relationship between these groups and the machine, embedded in the (pre-)existing organisational and system structures. In this article, we focus on the important, but often neglected, group of integrators within such a sociotechnical system. In complex human-machine configurations, integrators carry responsibility for linking the disparate groups of developers and users in the political and military system. To act as the mediating group requires a deep understanding of the other groups' activities, perspectives and norms. We thus ask which challenges and shortcomings emerge from integrating AI systems into resort-to-force (RTF) decision-making processes, and how to address them. To answer this, we proceed in three steps. First, we conceptualise the relationship between different groups of actors and AI systems as a sociotechnical system. Second, we identify challenges within such systems for human-machine teaming in RTF decisions. We focus on challenges that arise a) from the technology itself, b) from the integrators' role in the sociotechnical system, c) from the human-machine interaction. Third, we provide policy recommendations to address these shortcomings when integrating AI systems into RTF decision-making structures.