Shijun Lei

Shijun Lei, Hongyu Wang, Yunji Liang et al.

In-group favoritism refers to the phenomena of favoring members of one's in-group over out-group members and is widely observed in numerous social cooperative behaviors. Recently, in-group favoritism biases have also been identified in generative language models. However, whether the in-group favoritism exists when persona agents are faced with contradicting information (e.g., misinformation), and how to mitigate the adverse effects of in-group favoritism biases in persona agents have been understudied. To address these problems, we propose a Truth or Tribe simulation framework to study the agent cooperation within the spread of contradicting information through a triadic interaction paradigm, and conduct controlled trials to evaluate the primary moderating factors. Extensive results showcase that persona agents display strong in-group favoritism, accepting incorrect answers from identity-similar peers at much higher rates than from dissimilar peers. In-group favoritism continues to emerge in defeasible reasoning contexts where no absolute truth exists, and it intensifies as cognitive complexity increases. Furthermore, three intervention strategies--Identity-Blind Instruction, Structured Counterfactual Reasoning, and Heterogeneous Perspective Ensemble--are proposed to mitigate the in-group favoritism.

Shijun Lei, Quang Nguyen, Swapneel S Mehta et al.

Agent-based modeling (ABM) has long been used in economics to study human behavior, and large language model (LLM) agents now enable new forms of social and economic simulation. While prior work has discovered strategic deception by LLM agents in financial trading and auction markets, e-commerce remains underexplored despite its distinctive information asymmetry: sellers privately observe product quality, whereas buyers rely on advertised claims and reputation signals. We introduce TruthMarketTwin, a controlled simulation framework for studying LLM-agent behavior in e-commerce markets. The framework is one of the first to model bilateral trade under asymmetric information sharing, where agents make strategic listing, purchasing, rating, and recourse-related decisions to optimize seller profit and buyer utility. We find that LLM agents released into traditional markets autonomously exploit weaknesses in reputation-based governance, while warrant enforcement reduces deception and reshapes strategic reasoning. Our results position LLM-agent simulation as a tool for studying institution-governed autonomous markets.