Victor Barroso-Nascimento

Victor Barroso-Nascimento

This paper introduces higher-order (``nested") Kripke models, a generalization of Kripke models that is remarkably close to Kripke's original idea -- both mathematically and conceptually. Standard models are now $0$-ary models, whereas $n$-ary models for $n > 0$ are models whose set of objects (``possible worlds'') contain only $(n-1)$-ary models. A key idea is the use of worlds as fixed points for modal definitions, in the sense that what is necessary or possible in a world of a frame depends only on what is true in the same world on the accessible frames. This paper mainly deals with the paradigmatic cases of intuitionistic modal logics $IK$ and $MK$, from which the generalisation to other non-classical logics arises naturally. The association between conditions on accessibility relations and modal axioms also carries over to this framework, so modal logics stronger than $K$ can be obtained by imposing requirements on the relations between frames. Just like Kripke models define a concept of ``alternative'' for classical models, the $n$-ary models (for $n > 0$) defines the same concept for any interpretation of the $(n-1)$-ary models.

Victor Barroso-Nascimento, Maria Osório, Elaine Pimentel

Logical bilateralism challenges traditional concepts of logic by treating assertion and denial as independent yet opposed acts. While initially devised to justify classical logic, its constructive variants show that both acts admit intuitionistic interpretations. This paper presents a bilateral system where a formula cannot be both provable and refutable without contradiction, offering a framework for modelling epistemic entities, such as mathematical proofs and refutations, that exclude inconsistency. The logic is formalised through a bilateral natural deduction system with desirable proof-theoretic properties, including normalisation. We also introduce a base-extension semantics requiring explicit constructions of proofs and refutations while preventing them from being established for the same formula. The semantics is proven sound and complete with respect to the calculus. Finally, we show that our notion of refutation corresponds to David Nelson's constructive falsity, extending rather than revising intuitionistic logic and reinforcing the system's suitability for representing constructive epistemic reasoning.

Luiz Carlos Pereira, Victor Barroso-Nascimento, Elaine Pimentel

In this paper, we revisit Glivenko's theorems, foundational results relating classical and intuitionistic logic, from an ecumenical perspective. We begin by discussing the historical context and significance of Glivenko's original contributions, and then examine their extensions and reinterpretations within ecumenical logical frameworks. Our analysis focuses on three ecumenical systems: Prawitz's natural deduction system NE; the system NEK, closely related to one introduced by Krauss in an unpublished manuscript; and the ECI system proposed by Barroso-Nascimento.