Nadia Dahmani

2papers

2 Papers

7.1CEMay 6
A Blockchain-as-a-Service Solution for TAFES-Compliant Verification of Fair Trade Certifications

Nadia Dahmani, Peihao Li, Ravi S. Sharma

\abstract{\textbf{Purpose:} This study addresses the lack of trust in ethical product labels by designing a blockchain platform grounded in the TAFES principles (Transparency, Accountability, Fairness, Ethics, Safety). It aims to bridge the gap between blockchain's theoretical transparency and a responsible, real-world implementation for certification ecosystems. \textbf{Design/Methodology/Approach:} Using Action Design Research, we developed a proof-of-concept platform for label authentication. A hybrid architecture records critical events on an Ethereum Layer-2 network for security, while supporting evidence is stored off-chain via IPFS and linked via content identifiers. The solution was validated through a coffee supply chain scenario. \textbf{Findings:} The proof of concept demonstrates how a TAFES-aligned blockchain platform can support verification of label claims without requiring trust in a single intermediary by creating tamper-evident provenance records and auditable certification evidence across multiple stakeholders. The design supports low-cost, near-real-time anchoring of supply chain events while mitigating adoption barriers related to scalability, privacy, and operational viability. \textbf{Originality/Value:} This research contributes an integrated ethical and technical blueprint for trustworthy label authentication systems by translating TAFES into implementable design requirements and evaluation checks, and validating them through an ADR driven proof of concept. It advances prior work by moving from the question of whether blockchain can help to the question of how it should be implemented responsibly in multi stakeholder certification ecosystems.}

20.6CEMay 7
Arbitrage and the Stability of AMM Price Tracking

Peihao Li, Nadia Dahmani, Wenqi Cai

Automated market makers (AMMs) quote prices from pool state rather than from a limit order book. AMM pools often stay close to a reference price because arbitrageurs correct profitable mispricing. A large part of decentralized finance therefore relies on a simple economic premise: once the AMM price drifts away from the reference price, arbitrage incentives push it back. This paper studies when that premise is strong enough to guarantee block-scale stability. We model the gap between the reference price and the AMM price as a stochastic tracking error, treat arbitrage as the corrective input, and place blockchain execution inside the loop through fees, discrete blocks, transaction ordering, delays, and transaction failure. The detailed execution layer is reduced to the total successful correction confirmed in each block. Under a block-level correction condition, we prove geometric ergodicity of the tracking error and obtain explicit one-step bounds that connect tracking quality to liquidity and execution quality. We also show in a constant-product example how fees, fixed execution costs, and local liquidity map into the no-trade band and the optimal corrective trade. Finally, we build empirical proxies for the theorem quantities from realized block data and use them to organize reduced and mechanism-focused simulations whose comparative statics are consistent with the theory. The contribution is to turn a basic economic intuition behind decentralized finance into a quantitative stability statement together with a tractable calibration interface.