Hariom Tatsat

Hariom Tatsat, Ariye Shater

AI agents are promising for high-stakes enterprise workflows, but dependable deployment remains limited because tool-use failures are difficult to diagnose and control. Agents may skip required tool calls, invoke tools unnecessarily, or take actions whose consequence becomes visible only after execution. Existing observability methods are mostly external: prompts reveal correlations, evaluations score outputs, and logs arrive only after the model has already acted. In long-horizon settings, these failures are especially costly because an early tool mistake can alter the rest of the trajectory, increase token consumption, and create downstream safety and security risk. We introduce a mechanistic-interpretability toolkit built on Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) and linear probes. The framework reads model states before each action and infers both whether a tool is needed and how consequential the next tool action is likely to be. By decomposing activations into sparse features, it identifies the internal layers and features most associated with tool decisions and tests their functional importance through feature ablation. We train the probes on multi-step trajectories from the NVIDIA Nemotron function-calling dataset and apply the same workflow to GPT-OSS 20B and Gemma 3 27B models. The goal is not to replace external evaluation, but to add a missing layer: visibility into what the model signaled internally before action. This helps surface deeper causes of agent failure, especially in long-horizon runs where an early mistake can reshape the rest of the agentic interaction. More broadly, the paper shows how mechanistic interpretability can support practical internal observability for monitoring tool calls and risk in agent systems.

Hariom Tatsat, Ariye Shater

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a spectrum of tasks in financial services, including report generation, chatbots, sentiment analysis, regulatory compliance, investment advisory, financial knowledge retrieval, and summarization. However, their intrinsic complexity and lack of transparency pose significant challenges, especially in the highly regulated financial sector, where interpretability, fairness, and accountability are critical. As far as we are aware, this paper presents the first application in the finance domain of understanding and utilizing the inner workings of LLMs through mechanistic interpretability, addressing the pressing need for transparency and control in AI systems. Mechanistic interpretability is the most intuitive and transparent way to understand LLM behavior by reverse-engineering their internal workings. By dissecting the activations and circuits within these models, it provides insights into how specific features or components influence predictions - making it possible not only to observe but also to modify model behavior. In this paper, we explore the theoretical aspects of mechanistic interpretability and demonstrate its practical relevance through a range of financial use cases and experiments, including applications in trading strategies, sentiment analysis, bias, and hallucination detection. While not yet widely adopted, mechanistic interpretability is expected to become increasingly vital as adoption of LLMs increases. Advanced interpretability tools can ensure AI systems remain ethical, transparent, and aligned with evolving financial regulations. In this paper, we have put special emphasis on how these techniques can help unlock interpretability requirements for regulatory and compliance purposes - addressing both current needs and anticipating future expectations from financial regulators globally.

Sebastian Jaimungal, Silvana Pesenti, Ye Sheng Wang et al.

We present a reinforcement learning (RL) approach for robust optimisation of risk-aware performance criteria. To allow agents to express a wide variety of risk-reward profiles, we assess the value of a policy using rank dependent expected utility (RDEU). RDEU allows the agent to seek gains, while simultaneously protecting themselves against downside risk. To robustify optimal policies against model uncertainty, we assess a policy not by its distribution, but rather, by the worst possible distribution that lies within a Wasserstein ball around it. Thus, our problem formulation may be viewed as an actor/agent choosing a policy (the outer problem), and the adversary then acting to worsen the performance of that strategy (the inner problem). We develop explicit policy gradient formulae for the inner and outer problems, and show its efficacy on three prototypical financial problems: robust portfolio allocation, optimising a benchmark, and statistical arbitrage.