Ingrid Scharlau

Hendrik Buschmeier, Heike M. Buhl, Friederike Kern et al.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

Leandra Fichtel, Maximilian Spliethöver, Eyke Hüllermeier et al.

The ability to generate explanations that are understood by explainees is the quintessence of explainable artificial intelligence. Since understanding depends on the explainee's background and needs, recent research focused on co-constructive explanation dialogues, where an explainer continuously monitors the explainee's understanding and adapts their explanations dynamically. We investigate the ability of large language models (LLMs) to engage as explainers in co-constructive explanation dialogues. In particular, we present a user study in which explainees interact with an LLM in two settings, one of which involves the LLM being instructed to explain a topic co-constructively. We evaluate the explainees' understanding before and after the dialogue, as well as their perception of the LLMs' co-constructive behavior. Our results suggest that LLMs show some co-constructive behaviors, such as asking verification questions, that foster the explainees' engagement and can improve understanding of a topic. However, their ability to effectively monitor the current understanding and scaffold the explanations accordingly remains limited.

Benjamin Paaßen, Suzana Alpsancar, Tobias Matzner et al.

Under the slogan of trustworthy AI, much of contemporary AI research is focused on designing AI systems and usage practices that inspire human trust and, thus, enhance adoption of AI systems. However, a person affected by an AI system may not be convinced by AI system design alone -- neither should they, if the AI system is embedded in a social context that gives good reason to believe that it is used in tension with a person's interest. In such cases, distrust in the system may be justified and necessary to build meaningful trust in the first place. We propose the term "healthy distrust" to describe such a justified, careful stance towards certain AI usage practices. We investigate prior notions of trust and distrust in computer science, sociology, history, psychology, and philosophy, outline a remaining gap that healthy distrust might fill and conceptualize healthy distrust as a crucial part for AI usage that respects human autonomy.