Lukas Bieringer

Kathrin Grosse, Lukas Bieringer, Tarek Richard Besold et al.

Recent works have identified a gap between research and practice in artificial intelligence security: threats studied in academia do not always reflect the practical use and security risks of AI. For example, while models are often studied in isolation, they form part of larger ML pipelines in practice. Recent works also brought forward that adversarial manipulations introduced by academic attacks are impractical. We take a first step towards describing the full extent of this disparity. To this end, we revisit the threat models of the six most studied attacks in AI security research and match them to AI usage in practice via a survey with 271 industrial practitioners. On the one hand, we find that all existing threat models are indeed applicable. On the other hand, there are significant mismatches: research is often too generous with the attacker, assuming access to information not frequently available in real-world settings. Our paper is thus a call for action to study more practical threat models in artificial intelligence security.

Lukas Bieringer, Sean McGregor, Nicole Nichols et al.

AI systems face a growing number of AI security threats that are increasingly exploited in the real world. Hence, shared AI incident reporting practices are emerging in industry as best practice and as mandated by regulatory requirements. Although non-AI cybersecurity and non-security AI reporting have progressed as industrial and policy norms, existing collections of practices do not meet the specific requirements posed by AI security reporting. we argue that established processes are not well aligned with AI security reporting due to fundamental shortcomings for the distinctive characteristics of AI systems. Some of these shortcomings are immediately addressable, while others remain unresolved technically or within social systems, like the treatment of IP or the ownership of a vulnerability. Based on this position, we examine the limitations of current AI security incident reporting proposals. We conclude that the advent of AI agents will further reinforce the need to advance specialized AI security incident reporting.

Lukas Bieringer, Kathrin Grosse, Michael Backes et al.

Although machine learning is widely used in practice, little is known about practitioners' understanding of potential security challenges. In this work, we close this substantial gap and contribute a qualitative study focusing on developers' mental models of the machine learning pipeline and potentially vulnerable components. Similar studies have helped in other security fields to discover root causes or improve risk communication. Our study reveals two \facets of practitioners' mental models of machine learning security. Firstly, practitioners often confuse machine learning security with threats and defences that are not directly related to machine learning. Secondly, in contrast to most academic research, our participants perceive security of machine learning as not solely related to individual models, but rather in the context of entire workflows that consist of multiple components. Jointly with our additional findings, these two facets provide a foundation to substantiate mental models for machine learning security and have implications for the integration of adversarial machine learning into corporate workflows, \new{decreasing practitioners' reported uncertainty}, and appropriate regulatory frameworks for machine learning security.