Ana Busic

2papers

2 Papers

SYJan 12, 2020
Arbitrage with Power Factor Correction using Energy Storage

Md Umar Hashmi, Deepjyoti Deka, Ana Busic et al.

The importance of reactive power compensation for power factor (PF) correction will significantly increase with the large-scale integration of distributed generation interfaced via inverters producing only active power. In this work, we focus on co-optimizing energy storage for performing energy arbitrage as well as local power factor correction. The joint optimization problem is non-convex, but can be solved efficiently using a McCormick relaxation along with penalty-based schemes. Using numerical simulations on real data and realistic storage profiles, we show that energy storage can correct PF locally without reducing arbitrage profit. It is observed that active and reactive power control is largely decoupled in nature for performing arbitrage and PF correction (PFC). Furthermore, we consider a real-time implementation of the problem with uncertain load, renewable and pricing profiles. We develop a model predictive control based storage control policy using auto-regressive forecast for the uncertainty. We observe that PFC is primarily governed by the size of the converter and therefore, look-ahead in time in the online setting does not affect PFC noticeably. However, arbitrage profit are more sensitive to uncertainty for batteries with faster ramp rates compared to slow ramping batteries.

3.4GTMay 13
Learning Equilibria in Coordination Games via Minorization-Maximization

Ashok Krishnan K. S., Helene Le Cadre, Ana Busic

This paper considers games where the utilities for agents are the sum of a term proportional to a social utility, and another term that is an individual cost or reward. The agents are assumed to be irrational in their perception of the individual cost or reward. The multi equilibrium game is regularized, and its strictly concave potential function is used to select a unique equilibrium. This selected equilibrium is shown to be an $ε-$equilibrium of the original game, where $ε$ is parametrized by the regularizing function. A minorization-maximization based iterative learning scheme is proposed to learn equilibria in this game. This scheme converges to the potential-optimal equilibrium, and has superior convergence behaviour in comparison to gradient and best response methods.