Heming Yang

Heming Yang, Ke Yang, Erhan Zhang

Celebrity Endorsement is one of the most significant strategies in brand communication. Nowadays, more and more companies try to build a vivid characteristic for themselves. Therefore, their brand identity communications should accord with some characteristics as humans and regulations. However, the previous works mostly stop by assumptions, instead of proposing a specific way to perform matching between brands and celebrities. In this paper, we propose a brand celebrity matching model (BCM) based on Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques. Given a brand and a celebrity, we firstly obtain some descriptive documents of them from the Internet, then summarize these documents, and finally calculate a matching degree between the brand and the celebrity to determine whether they are matched. According to the experimental result, our proposed model outperforms the best baselines with a 0.362 F1 score and 6.3% of accuracy, which indicates the effectiveness and application value of our model in the real-world scene. What's more, to our best knowledge, the proposed BCM model is the first work on using NLP to solve endorsement issues, so it can provide some novel research ideas and methodologies for the following works.

Qinghong Yin, Yu Tian, Heming Yang et al.

Concept erasure aims to selectively unlearning undesirable content in diffusion models (DMs) to reduce the risk of sensitive content generation. As a novel paradigm in concept erasure, most existing methods employ adversarial training to identify and suppress target concepts, thus reducing the likelihood of sensitive outputs. However, these methods often neglect the specificity of adversarial training in DMs, resulting in only partial mitigation. In this work, we investigate and quantify this specificity from the perspective of concept space, i.e., can adversarial samples truly fit the target concept space? We observe that existing methods neglect the role of conceptual semantics when generating adversarial samples, resulting in ineffective fitting of concept spaces. This oversight leads to the following issues: 1) when there are few adversarial samples, they fail to comprehensively cover the object concept; 2) conversely, they will disrupt other target concept spaces. Motivated by the analysis of these findings, we introduce S-GRACE (Semantics-Guided Robust Adversarial Concept Erasure), which grace leveraging semantic guidance within the concept space to generate adversarial samples and perform erasure training. Experiments conducted with seven state-of-the-art methods and three adversarial prompt generation strategies across various DM unlearning scenarios demonstrate that S-GRACE significantly improves erasure performance 26%, better preserves non-target concepts, and reduces training time by 90%. Our code is available at https://github.com/Qhong-522/S-GRACE.

Yu Tian, Xiao Yang, Yinpeng Dong et al.

Extremely large image generators offer significant transformative potential across diverse sectors. It allows users to design specific prompts to generate realistic images through some black-box APIs. However, some studies reveal that image generators are notably susceptible to attacks and generate Not Suitable For Work (NSFW) contents by manually designed toxin texts, especially imperceptible to human observers. We urgently need a multitude of universal and transferable prompts to improve the safety of image generators, especially black-box-released APIs. Nevertheless, they are constrained by labor-intensive design processes and heavily reliant on the quality of the given instructions. To achieve this, we introduce a black-box stealthy prompt attack (BSPA) that adopts a retriever to simulate attacks from API users. It can effectively harness filter scores to tune the retrieval space of sensitive words for matching the input prompts, thereby crafting stealthy prompts tailored for image generators. Significantly, this approach is model-agnostic and requires no internal access to the model's features, ensuring its applicability to a wide range of image generators. Building on BSPA, we have constructed an automated prompt tool and a comprehensive prompt attack dataset (NSFWeval). Extensive experiments demonstrate that BSPA effectively explores the security vulnerabilities in a variety of state-of-the-art available black-box models, including Stable Diffusion XL, Midjourney, and DALL-E 2/3. Furthermore, we develop a resilient text filter and offer targeted recommendations to ensure the security of image generators against prompt attacks in the future.

Bin Wang, Heming Yang, Jinfang Sheng

Recent studies have shown that by introducing prior knowledge, multi-scale analysis of complex and non-stationary time series in real environments can achieve good results in the field of long-term forecasting. However, affected by channel-independent methods, models based on multi-scale analysis may produce suboptimal prediction results due to the autocorrelation between time series labels, which in turn affects the generalization ability of the model. To address this challenge, we are inspired by the idea of sharpness-aware minimization and the recently proposed FreDF method and design a deep learning model TimeCF for long-term time series forecasting based on the TimeMixer, combined with our designed adaptive convolution information aggregation module and Sharpness-Aware Minimization Frequency Domain Loss (SAMFre). Specifically, TimeCF first decomposes the original time series into sequences of different scales. Next, the same-sized convolution modules are used to adaptively aggregate information of different scales on sequences of different scales. Then, decomposing each sequence into season and trend parts and the two parts are mixed at different scales through bottom-up and top-down methods respectively. Finally, different scales are aggregated through a Feed-Forward Network. What's more, extensive experimental results on different real-world datasets show that our proposed TimeCF has excellent performance in the field of long-term forecasting.