Iván Arcuschin

Rohan Gupta, Iván Arcuschin, Thomas Kwa et al.

Mechanistic interpretability methods aim to identify the algorithm a neural network implements, but it is difficult to validate such methods when the true algorithm is unknown. This work presents InterpBench, a collection of semi-synthetic yet realistic transformers with known circuits for evaluating these techniques. We train simple neural networks using a stricter version of Interchange Intervention Training (IIT) which we call Strict IIT (SIIT). Like the original, SIIT trains neural networks by aligning their internal computation with a desired high-level causal model, but it also prevents non-circuit nodes from affecting the model's output. We evaluate SIIT on sparse transformers produced by the Tracr tool and find that SIIT models maintain Tracr's original circuit while being more realistic. SIIT can also train transformers with larger circuits, like Indirect Object Identification (IOI). Finally, we use our benchmark to evaluate existing circuit discovery techniques.

Atticus Wang, Iván Arcuschin, Arthur Conmy

Reward models are central to large language model (LLM) post-training. However, past work has shown that they can reward spurious or undesirable attributes such as length, format, hallucinations, and sycophancy. In this work, we introduce and study the research problem of automatically finding reward model biases in natural language. We offer a simple approach of using an LLM to iteratively propose and refine candidate biases. Our method can recover known biases and surface novel ones: for example, we found that Skywork-V2-8B, a leading open-weight reward model, often mistakenly favors responses with redundant spacing and responses with hallucinated content. In addition, we show evidence that evolutionary iteration outperforms flat best-of-N search, and we validate the recall of our pipeline using synthetically injected biases. We hope our work contributes to further research on improving RMs through automated interpretability methods.

Austin Meek, Eitan Sprejer, Iván Arcuschin et al.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

Iván Arcuschin, David Chanin, Adrià Garriga-Alonso et al.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often provide chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning traces that appear plausible, but may hide internal biases. We call these *unverbalized biases*. Monitoring models via their stated reasoning is therefore unreliable, and existing bias evaluations typically require predefined categories and hand-crafted datasets. In this work, we introduce a fully automated, black-box pipeline for detecting task-specific unverbalized biases. Given a task dataset, the pipeline uses LLM autoraters to generate candidate bias concepts. It then tests each concept on progressively larger input samples by generating positive and negative variations, and applies statistical techniques for multiple testing and early stopping. A concept is flagged as an unverbalized bias if it yields statistically significant performance differences while not being cited as justification in the model's CoTs. We evaluate our pipeline across six LLMs on three decision tasks (hiring, loan approval, and university admissions). Our technique automatically discovers previously unknown biases in these models (e.g., Spanish fluency, English proficiency, writing formality). In the same run, the pipeline also validates biases that were manually identified by prior work (gender, race, religion, ethnicity). More broadly, our proposed approach provides a practical, scalable path to automatic task-specific bias discovery.

Iván Arcuschin, Jett Janiak, Robert Krzyzanowski et al.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Constantin Venhoff, Iván Arcuschin, Philip Torr et al.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to the development of thinking language models that generate extensive internal reasoning chains before producing responses. While these models achieve improved performance, controlling their reasoning processes remains challenging. This work presents a steering approach for thinking LLMs by analyzing and manipulating specific reasoning behaviors in DeepSeek-R1-Distill models. Through a systematic experiment on 500 tasks across 10 diverse categories, we identify several reasoning behaviors exhibited by thinking models, including expressing uncertainty, generating examples for hypothesis validation, and backtracking in reasoning chains. We demonstrate that these behaviors are mediated by linear directions in the model's activation space and can be controlled using steering vectors. By extracting and applying these vectors, we provide a method to modulate specific aspects of the model's reasoning process, such as its tendency to backtrack or express uncertainty. Our approach offers practical tools for steering reasoning processes in thinking models in a controlled and interpretable manner. We validate our steering method using three DeepSeek-R1-Distill models, demonstrating consistent control across different model architectures.

Aaron Mueller, Atticus Geiger, Sarah Wiegreffe et al. · stanford

How can we know whether new mechanistic interpretability methods achieve real improvements? In pursuit of lasting evaluation standards, we propose MIB, a Mechanistic Interpretability Benchmark, with two tracks spanning four tasks and five models. MIB favors methods that precisely and concisely recover relevant causal pathways or causal variables in neural language models. The circuit localization track compares methods that locate the model components - and connections between them - most important for performing a task (e.g., attribution patching or information flow routes). The causal variable localization track compares methods that featurize a hidden vector, e.g., sparse autoencoders (SAEs) or distributed alignment search (DAS), and align those features to a task-relevant causal variable. Using MIB, we find that attribution and mask optimization methods perform best on circuit localization. For causal variable localization, we find that the supervised DAS method performs best, while SAE features are not better than neurons, i.e., non-featurized hidden vectors. These findings illustrate that MIB enables meaningful comparisons, and increases our confidence that there has been real progress in the field.

Constantin Venhoff, Iván Arcuschin, Philip Torr et al.

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.