Jianle Ba

Yuntao Wang, Jianle Ba, Han Liu et al.

The rapid evolution of large language model (LLM)-driven autonomous agents has given rise to OpenClaw, a new class of open-source agent frameworks that operate as continuously running, skill-augmented systems with persistent memory, multi-channel interaction, and high degrees of autonomy. Such capabilities enable OpenClaw agents to autonomously execute complex, multi-step tasks and interact seamlessly with external applications, but simultaneously introduce a substantially enlarged attack surface. In particular, the combination of high-privilege operations and persistent memory exposes OpenClaw agents to various emerging threats, including skill poisoning, cognitive manipulation, multi-agent cascading failures, and supply-chain vulnerabilities. In this survey, we present a comprehensive study of the security landscape of OpenClaw agents. We first examine the general architecture and key characteristics that distinguish OpenClaw agents from traditional AI agent systems. We categorize existing security and privacy threats into a layered framework and analyze how vulnerabilities arise during agent reasoning, action execution, and external interaction. Representative defense mechanisms are also reviewed to draw the current defense landscape. Finally, several unresolved issues related to the reliability and trustworthiness of OpenClaw ecosystems are discussed.

Yuntao Wang, Haojia Yang, Han Liu et al.

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms are increasingly deployed in vast low-altitude applications, owing to their capabilities in distributed sensing, flexible communication, and autonomous coordination. Nevertheless, the open and highly dynamic operating environment of UAV swarms introduces serious security risks, including GPS spoofing, insider threats, and multi-hop intrusion. These threats are aggravated by limited on-board resources, frequently changing network topology, and the presence of intelligent adversaries. To tackle these issues, this paper proposes a cloud-edge-end collaborative defense framework for UAV swarms. Based on this framework, three complementary mechanisms are developed. First, a cooperative perception scheme is designed to resist GPS spoofing via interactive attack-defense game modeling. Second, a behavior-driven authentication method with trust evaluation is developed to mitigate insider threats. Third, a multi-agent attack forensics framework is devised to intelligently trace the propagation paths of multi-hop attacks in UAV networks. Experimental results validate the effectiveness of the proposed approaches. Finally, several open research directions are outlined.