Dario Bauso

Danielle C. Tarraf, Dario Bauso

We consider logistic networks in which the control and disturbance inputs take values in finite sets. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of robustly control invariant (hyperbox) sets. We show that a stronger version of this condition is sufficient to guarantee robust global attractivity, and we construct a counterexample demonstrating that it is not necessary. Being constructive, our proofs of sufficiency allow us to extract the corresponding robust control laws and to establish the invariance of certain sets. Finally, we highlight parallels between our results and existing results in the literature, and we conclude our study with two simple illustrative examples.

Leonardo Stella, Dario Bauso

Given a large number of homogeneous players that are distributed across three possible states, we consider the problem in which these players have to control their transition rates, while minimizing a cost. The optimal transition rates are based on the players' knowledge of their current state and of the distribution of all the other players, and this introduces mean-field terms in the running and the terminal cost. The first contribution involves a mean-field game model that brings together macroscopic and microscopic dynamics. We obtain the mean-field equilibrium associated with this model, by solving the corresponding initial-terminal value problem. We perform an asymptotic analysis to obtain a stationary equilibrium for the system. The second contribution involves the study of the microscopic dynamics of the system for a finite number of players that interact in a structured environment modeled by an interaction topology. The third contribution is the specialization of the model to describe honeybee swarms, virus propagation, and cascading failures in interconnected smart-grids. A numerical analysis is conducted which involves two types of cyber-attacks. We simulate in which ways failures propagate across the interconnected smart grids and the impact on the grids frequencies. We reframe our analysis within the context of Lyapunov's linearisation method and stability theory of nonlinear systems and Kuramoto coupled oscillators model.

Dario Bauso, Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Tamer Basar

This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the instantaneous allocations subject to budget constraints. Before the game starts, the central planner knows the nature of the process (bounded mean ergodic), the bounded set from which the coalitions' values are sampled, and the long run average coalitions' values. On the other hand, he has no knowledge of the underlying probability function generating the coalitions' values. Our goal is to find allocation rules that use a measure of the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time by re-distributing the budget among the players. The objective is two-fold: i) guaranteeing convergence of the average allocations to the core (or a specific point in the core) of the average game, ii) driving the coalitions' excesses to an a priori given cone. The resulting allocation rules are robust as they guarantee the aforementioned convergence properties despite the uncertain and time-varying nature of the coaltions' values. We highlight three main contributions. First, we design an allocation rule based on full observation of the extra reward so that the average allocation approaches a specific point in the core of the average game, while the coalitions' excesses converge to an a priori given direction. Second, we design a new allocation rule based on partial observation on the extra reward so that the average allocation converges to the core of the average game, while the coalitions' excesses converge to an a priori given cone. And third, we establish connections to approachability theory and attainability theory.

Leonardo Stella, Dario Bauso

Given a large population of players, each player has three possible choices between option 1 or 2 or no option. The two options are equally favorable and the population has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly and in a distributed way. The more popular an option is, the more likely it is to be chosen by uncommitted players. Uncommitted players can be attracted by those committed to any of the other two options through a cross-inhibitory signal. This model originates in the context of honeybees swarms, and we generalize it to duopolistic competition and opinion dynamics. The contributions of this work include (1) the formulation of an evolutionary game model to explain the behavioral traits of the honeybees, (2) the study of the individuals and collective behavior including equilibrium points and stability, (3) the extension of the results to the case of structured environment via complex network theory, (4) the analysis of the impact of the connectivity on consensus, and (5) the study of absolute stability for the collective system under time-varying and uncertain cross-inhibitory parameter.