Mark Whitmeyer

PR
3papers
34citations
Novelty43%
AI Score22

3 Papers

PRMay 25, 2022
Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets

Pak Hung Au, Mark Whitmeyer

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, the countervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion yield a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm's realized effective value. If the expected quality of the products is sufficiently high (or competition is sufficiently fierce), this corresponds to full information--firms provide the first-best level of information. If not, this corresponds to information dispersion--firms randomize over signals.

PROct 22, 2018
A Game of Nontransitive Dice

Artem Hulko, Mark Whitmeyer

We consider a two player simultaneous-move game where the two players each select any permissible $n$-sided die for a fixed integer $n$. A player wins if the outcome of his roll is greater than that of his opponent. Remarkably, for $n>3$, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. The unique Nash Equilibrium is for each player to throw the Standard $n$-sided die, where each side has a different number. Our proof of uniqueness is constructive. We introduce an algorithm with which, for any nonstandard die, we may generate another die that beats it.

PRApr 23, 2018
A Game of Random Variables

Artem Hulko, Mark Whitmeyer

This paper analyzes a simple game with $n$ players. We fix a mean, $μ$, in the interval $[0, 1]$ and let each player choose any random variable distributed on that interval with the given mean. The winner of the zero-sum game is the player whose random variable has the highest realization. We show that the position of the mean within the interval is paramount. Remarkably, if the given mean is above a crucial threshold then the unique equilibrium must contain a point mass on $1$. The cutoff is strictly decreasing in the number of players, $n$; and for fixed $μ$, as the number of players is increased, each player places more weight on $1$ at equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium as the number of players goes to infinity.