Alexandra Duel-Hallen

Lu An, Jie Duan, Yuan Zhang et al.

Microgrids are self-sufficient small-scale power grid systems that can employ renewable generation sources and energy storage devices and can connect to the main grid or operate in a stand-alone mode. Most research on energy-storage management in microgrids does not take into account the dynamic nature of the problem and the need for fully-distributed, multi-step scheduling. First, we address these requirements by extending our previously proposed \textit{multi-step cooperative distributed energy scheduling} (CoDES) algorithm to include both purchasing power from and selling the generated power to the main grid. Second, we model the microgrid as a multi-agent system where the agents (e.g. households) act as players in a cooperative game and employ a distributed algorithm based on the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to fairly allocate the costs of cooperative power management (computed using CoDES) among themselves. The dependency of the day-ahead power schedule and the costs on system parameters, e.g., the price schedule and the user activity level (measured by whether it owns storage and renewable generation devices), is analyzed for a three-agent microgrid example.

Feier Lian, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

Multi-agent networked linear dynamic systems have attracted attention of researchers in power systems, intelligent transportation, and industrial automation. The agents might cooperatively optimize a global performance objective, resulting in social optimization, or try to satisfy their own selfish objectives using a noncooperative differential game. However, in these solutions, large volumes of data must be sent from system states to possibly distant control inputs, thus resulting in high cost of the underlying communication network. To enable economically-viable communication, a game-theoretic framework is proposed under the \textit{communication cost}, or \textit{sparsity}, constraint, given by the number of communicating state/control input pairs. As this constraint tightens, the system transitions from dense to sparse communication, providing the trade-off between dynamic system performance and information exchange. Moreover, using the proposed sparsity-constrained distributed social optimization and noncooperative game algorithms, we develop a method to allocate the costs of the communication infrastructure fairly and according to the agents' diverse needs for feedback and cooperation. Numerical results illustrate utilization of the proposed algorithms to enable and ensure economic fairness of wide-area control among power companies.

Amirhassan Fallah Dizche, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

In this paper we present an online wide-area oscillation damping control (WAC) design for uncertain models of power systems using ideas from reinforcement learning. We assume that the exact small-signal model of the power system at the onset of a contingency is not known to the operator and use the nominal model and online measurements of the generator states and control inputs to rapidly converge to a state-feedback controller that minimizes a given quadratic energy cost. However, unlike conventional linear quadratic regulators (LQR), we intend our controller to be sparse, so its implementation reduces the communication costs. We, therefore, employ the gradient support pursuit (GraSP) optimization algorithm to impose sparsity constraints on the control gain matrix during learning. The sparse controller is thereafter implemented using distributed communication. Using the IEEE 39-bus power system model with 1149 unknown parameters, it is demonstrated that the proposed learning method provides reliable LQR performance while the controller matched to the nominal model becomes unstable for severely uncertain systems.

Pratishtha Shukla, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a network control system. We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player, mixed strategy game, where the attacker attempts to destroy communication equipment of some nodes, and thereby render the LQR feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance. The defender, on the other hand, aims to prevent this loss. Both players trade their control performance objectives for the cost of their actions. A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) of the game represents the allocation of the players' respective resources for attacking or protecting the network nodes. We analyze the dependence of a MSNE on the relative budgets of the players as well as on the important network nodes that must be preserved to achieve a desirable LQR performance. MSNE is computed using nonlinear programming. Results are validated using the New England power system model, and it is shown that reliable defense is feasible unless the cost of attack is very low or much smaller than the cost of protection per generator.