Jesus E. Contreras-Ocaña

Jesus E. Contreras-Ocaña, Miguel A. Ortega-Vazquez, Baosen Zhang · uw

We study competition and cooperation among a group of storage units. We show that as the number of storages increases, the profit of storages approaches zero under Nash competition. We propose two ways in which storages can achieve non-zero profit and show that they are optimal in the sense that storages achieve the maximum possible profit. The first is a decentralized approach in which storages are exposed to artificial cost functions that incentivize them to behavior as a coalition. No private information needs to be exchanged between the storages to calculate the artificial function. The second is a centralized approach in which an aggregator coordinates and splits profits with storages in order to achieve maximum profit. We use Nash's axiomatic bargaining problem to model and predict the profit split between aggregator and storages.

Jesus E. Contreras-Ocaña, Uzma Siddiqi, Baosen Zhang

Distributed energy resources (DERs) can serve as non-wire alternatives to capacity expansion by managing peak load to avoid or defer traditional expansion projects. In this paper, we study a planning problem that co-optimizes DERs investment and operation (e.g., energy efficiency, energy storage, demand response, solar photovoltaic) and the timing of capacity expansion. We formulate the problem as a large scale (in the order of millions of variables because we model the operation of DERs over a period of decades) non-convex optimization problem. Despite its non-convexities, we find its optimal solution by decomposing it using the Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition Algorithm and solving a series of small linear problems. Finally, we present a real planning problem at the University of Washington Seattle Campus.