Gyunghoon Park

Hyungbo Shim, Gyunghoon Park, Youngjun Joo et al.

This paper presents a tutorial-style review on the recent results about the disturbance observer (DOB) in view of robust stabilization and recovery of the nominal performance. The analysis is based on the case when the bandwidth of Q-filter is large, and it is explained in a pedagogical manner that, even in the presence of plant uncertainties and disturbances, the behavior of real uncertain plant can be made almost similar to that of disturbance-free nominal system both in the transient and in the steady-state. The conventional DOB is interpreted in a new perspective, and its restrictions and extensions are discussed.

Jihan Kim, Gyunghoon Park, Hyungbo Shim et al.

In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data framework, most anomaly detectors monitor the plant's output only at discrete time instants, and thus, nothing abnormal can be detected as long as the sampled output behaves normal. This implies that if an actuator attack drives the plant's state to pass through the kernel of the output matrix at each sensing time, then the attack compromises the system while remaining stealthy. We show that this type of attack always exists when the sampled-data system has an input redundancy, i.e., the number of inputs being larger than that of the outputs or the sampling rate of the actuators being higher than that of the sensors. Simulation results for the X-38 vehicle and for the other numerical examples illustrate this new attack strategy possibly brings disastrous consequences.