Christopher W. Miller

2papers

2 Papers

OCJan 23, 2017
Optimal Control of Conditional Value-at-Risk in Continuous Time

Christopher W. Miller, Insoon Yang

We consider continuous-time stochastic optimal control problems featuring Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) in the objective. The major difficulty in these problems arises from time-inconsistency, which prevents us from directly using dynamic programming. To resolve this challenge, we convert to an equivalent bilevel optimization problem in which the inner optimization problem is standard stochastic control. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which the outer objective function is convex and differentiable. We compute the outer objective's value via a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and its gradient via the viscosity solution of a linear parabolic equation, which allows us to perform gradient descent. The significance of this result is that we provide an efficient dynamic programming-based algorithm for optimal control of CVaR without lifting the state-space. To broaden the applicability of the proposed algorithm, we propose convergent approximation schemes in cases where our key assumptions do not hold and characterize relevant suboptimality bounds. In addition, we extend our method to a more general class of risk metrics, which includes mean-variance and median-deviation. We also demonstrate a concrete application to portfolio optimization under CVaR constraints. Our results contribute an efficient framework for solving time-inconsistent CVaR-based sequential optimization.

OCJun 17, 2015
Optimal Dynamic Contracts for a Large-Scale Principal-Agent Hierarchy: A Concavity-Preserving Approach

Christopher W. Miller, Insoon Yang

We present a continuous-time contract whereby a top-level player can incentivize a hierarchy of players below him to act in his best interest despite only observing the output of his direct subordinate. This paper extends Sannikov's approach from a situation of asymmetric information between a principal and an agent to one of hierarchical information between several players. We develop an iterative algorithm for constructing an incentive compatible contract and define the correct notion of concavity which must be preserved during iteration. We identify conditions under which a dynamic programming construction of an optimal dynamic contract can be reduced to only a one-dimensional state space and one-dimensional control set, independent of the size of the hierarchy. In this sense, our results contribute to the applicability of dynamic programming on dynamic contracts for a large-scale principal-agent hierarchy.