Rineke Verbrugge

Rineke Verbrugge

The TARK conference (Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge) is a conference that aims to bring together researchers from a wide variety of fields, including computer science, artificial intelligence, game theory, decision theory, philosophy, logic, linguistics, and cognitive science. Its goal is to further our understanding of interdisciplinary issues involving reasoning about rationality and knowledge. Previous conferences have been held biennially around the world since 1986, on the initiative of Joe Halpern (Cornell University). Topics of interest include, but are not limited to, semantic models for knowledge, belief, awareness and uncertainty, bounded rationality and resource-bounded reasoning, commonsense epistemic reasoning, epistemic logic, epistemic game theory, knowledge and action, applications of reasoning about knowledge and other mental states, belief revision, computational social choice, algorithmic game theory, and foundations of multi-agent systems. Information about TARK, including conference proceedings, is available at http://www.tark.org/ These proceedings contain the papers that have been accepted for presentation at the Nineteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2023), held between June 28 and June 30, 2023, at the University of Oxford, United Kingdom. The conference website can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/tark-2023

Edoardo Baccini, Zoé Christoff, Nina Gierasimczuk et al.

The principle of minimal change in belief revision theory requires that, when accepting new information, one keeps one's belief state as close to the initial belief state as possible. This is precisely what the method known as minimal revision does. However, unlike less conservative belief revision methods, minimal revision falls short in learning power: It cannot learn everything that can be learned by other learning methods. We begin by showing that, despite this limitation, minimal revision is still a successful learning method in a wide range of situations. Firstly, it can learn any problem that is finitely identifiable. Secondly, it can learn with positive and negative data, as long as one considers finitely many possibilities. We then characterize the prior plausibility assignments (over finitely many possibilities) that enable one to learn via minimal revision, and do the same for conditioning and lexicographic upgrade. Finally, we show that not all of our results still hold when learning from possibly erroneous information.

Mouad Abrini, Omri Abend, Dina Acklin et al. · cambridge

This volume includes a selection of papers presented at the Workshop on Advancing Artificial Intelligence through Theory of Mind held at AAAI 2025 in Philadelphia US on 3rd March 2025. The purpose of this volume is to provide an open access and curated anthology for the ToM and AI research community.

Ramira van der Meulen, Rineke Verbrugge, Max van Duijn

The search for effective collaboration between humans and computer systems is one of the biggest challenges in Artificial Intelligence. One of the more effective mechanisms that humans use to coordinate with one another is theory of mind (ToM). ToM can be described as the ability to `take someone else's perspective and make estimations of their beliefs, desires and intentions, in order to make sense of their behaviour and attitudes towards the world'. If leveraged properly, this skill can be very useful in Human-AI collaboration. This introduces the question how we implement ToM when building an AI system. Humans and AI Systems work quite differently, and ToM is a multifaceted concept, each facet rooted in different research traditions across the cognitive and developmental sciences. We observe that researchers from artificial intelligence and the computing sciences, ourselves included, often have difficulties finding their way in the ToM literature. In this paper, we identify four common misconceptions around ToM that we believe should be taken into account when developing an AI system. We have hyperbolised these misconceptions for the sake of the argument, but add nuance in their discussion. The misconceptions we discuss are: (1) "Humans Use a ToM Module, So AI Systems Should As Well". (2) "Every Social Interaction Requires (Advanced) ToM". (3) "All ToM is the Same". (4) "Current Systems Already Have ToM". After discussing the misconception, we end each section by providing tentative guidelines on how the misconception can be overcome.

Atefeh Keshavarzi Zafarghandi, Rineke Verbrugge, Bart Verheij

Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) have been introduced as a formalism for modeling and evaluating argumentation allowing general logical satisfaction conditions. Different criteria used to settle the acceptance of arguments are called semantics. Semantics of ADFs have so far mainly been defined based on the concept of admissibility. However, the notion of strongly admissible semantics studied for abstract argumentation frameworks has not yet been introduced for ADFs. In the current work we present the concept of strong admissibility of interpretations for ADFs. Further, we show that strongly admissible interpretations of ADFs form a lattice with the grounded interpretation as top element.

Rineke Verbrugge

This file summarizes the plenary talk on laboratory experiments on logic at the TARK 2013 - 14th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge.