Yan Xu

CR
h-index32
5papers
34citations
Novelty60%
AI Score25

5 Papers

7.9CVMar 17, 2020
SiamSNN: Siamese Spiking Neural Networks for Energy-Efficient Object Tracking

Yihao Luo, Min Xu, Caihong Yuan et al.

Recently spiking neural networks (SNNs), the third-generation of neural networks has shown remarkable capabilities of energy-efficient computing, which is a promising alternative for deep neural networks (DNNs) with high energy consumption. SNNs have reached competitive results compared to DNNs in relatively simple tasks and small datasets such as image classification and MNIST/CIFAR, while few studies on more challenging vision tasks on complex datasets. In this paper, we focus on extending deep SNNs to object tracking, a more advanced vision task with embedded applications and energy-saving requirements, and present a spike-based Siamese network called SiamSNN. Specifically, we propose an optimized hybrid similarity estimation method to exploit temporal information in the SNNs, and introduce a novel two-status coding scheme to optimize the temporal distribution of output spike trains for further improvements. SiamSNN is the first deep SNN tracker that achieves short latency and low precision loss on the visual object tracking benchmarks OTB2013/2015, VOT2016/2018, and GOT-10k. Moreover, SiamSNN achieves notably low energy consumption and real-time on Neuromorphic chip TrueNorth.

5.2CRJan 3, 2020
Fair Auction and Trade Framework for Cloud VM Allocation based on Blockchain

Zhili Chen, Wei Ding, Yan Xu et al.

Cloud auctions provide cost-effective strategies for cloud VM allocation. Most existing cloud auctions simply assume that the auctioneer is trustable, and thus the fairness of auctions can be easily achieved. However, in fact, such a trustable auctioneer may not exist, and the fairness is non-trivial to guarantee. In this work, for the first time, we propose a decentralized cloud VM auction and trade framework based on blockchain. We realize both auction fairness and trade fairness among participants (e.g., cloud provider and cloud users) in this system, which guarantees the interest of each party will not suffer any loss as long as it follows the protocol. Furthermore, we implement our system through the local blockchain and Ethereum official test blockchain, carry out experimental simulations, and demonstrate the feasibility of our system.

5.2CRJan 3, 2020
Differentially Private Combinatorial Cloud Auction

Tianjiao Ni, Zhili Chen, Lin Chen et al.

Cloud service providers typically provide different types of virtual machines (VMs) to cloud users with various requirements. Thanks to its effectiveness and fairness, auction has been widely applied in this heterogeneous resource allocation. Recently, several strategy-proof combinatorial cloud auction mechanisms have been proposed. However, they fail to protect the bid privacy of users from being inferred from the auction results. In this paper, we design a differentially private combinatorial cloud auction mechanism (DPCA) to address this privacy issue. Technically, we employ the exponential mechanism to compute a clearing unit price vector with a probability proportional to the corresponding revenue. We further improve the mechanism to reduce the running time while maintaining high revenues, by computing a single clearing unit price, or a subgroup of clearing unit prices at a time, resulting in the improved mechanisms DPCA-S and its generalized version DPCA-M, respectively. We theoretically prove that our mechanisms can guarantee differential privacy, approximate truthfulness and high revenue. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that DPCA can generate near-optimal revenues at the price of relatively high time complexity, while the improved mechanisms achieve a tunable trade-off between auction revenue and running time.

6.8CRAug 10, 2019
Differentially Private Aggregated Mobility Data Publication Using Moving Characteristics

Zhili Chen, Xiaoli Kan, Shun Zhang et al.

With the rapid development of GPS enabled devices (smartphones) and location-based applications, location privacy is increasingly concerned. Intuitively, it is widely believed that location privacy can be preserved by publishing aggregated mobility data, such as the number of users in an area at some time. However, a recent attack shows that these aggregated mobility data can be exploited to recover individual trajectories. In this paper, we first propose two differentially private basic schemes for aggregated mobility data publication, namely direct perturbation and threshold perturbation, which preserve location privacy of users and especially resist the trajectory recovery attack. Then, we explore the moving characteristics of mobile users, and design an improved scheme named static hybrid perturbation by combining the two basic schemes according to the moving characteristics. Since static hybrid perturbation works only for static data, which are entirely available before publishing, we further adapt the static hybrid perturbation by combining it with linear regression, and yield another improved scheme named dynamic hybrid perturbation. The dynamic hybrid perturbation works also for dynamic data, which are generated on the fly during publication. Privacy analysis shows that the proposed schemes achieve differential privacy. Extensive experiments on both simulated and real datasets demonstrate that all proposed schemes resist the trajectory recovery attack well, and the improved schemes significantly outperform the basic schemes.

2.3CROct 18, 2018
Making Double Spectrum Auction Practical: Both Privacy and Efficiency Matter

Zhili Chen, Xuemei Wei, Hong Zhong et al.

Truthful spectrum auction is believed to be an effective method for spectrum redistribution. However, privacy concerns have largely hampered the practical applications of truthful spectrum auctions. In this paper, to make the applications of double spectrum auctions practical, we present a privacy-preserving and socially efficient double spectrum auction design, SDSA. Specifically, by combining three security techniques: homomorphic encryption, secret sharing and garbled circuits, we design a secure two-party protocol computing a socially efficient double spectrum auction, TDSA, without leaking any information about sellers' requests or buyers' bids beyond the auction outcome. We give the formal security definition in our context, and theoretically prove the security that our design achieves. Experimental results show that our design is also efficient in performance, even for large-scale double spectrum auctions.