Akash R. Wasil

Akash R. Wasil, Tom Reed, Jack William Miller et al.

What techniques can be used to verify compliance with international agreements about advanced AI development? In this paper, we examine 10 verification methods that could detect two types of potential violations: unauthorized AI training (e.g., training runs above a certain FLOP threshold) and unauthorized data centers. We divide the verification methods into three categories: (a) national technical means (methods requiring minimal or no access from suspected non-compliant nations), (b) access-dependent methods (methods that require approval from the nation suspected of unauthorized activities), and (c) hardware-dependent methods (methods that require rules around advanced hardware). For each verification method, we provide a description, historical precedents, and possible evasion techniques. We conclude by offering recommendations for future work related to the verification and enforcement of international AI governance agreements.

Akash R. Wasil, Peter Barnett, Michael Gerovitch et al.

International AI governance agreements and institutions may play an important role in reducing global security risks from advanced AI. To inform the design of such agreements and institutions, we conducted case studies of historical and contemporary international security agreements. We focused specifically on those arrangements around dual-use technologies, examining agreements in nuclear security, chemical weapons, biosecurity, and export controls. For each agreement, we examined four key areas: (a) purpose, (b) core powers, (c) governance structure, and (d) instances of non-compliance. From these case studies, we extracted lessons for the design of international AI agreements and governance institutions. We discuss the importance of robust verification methods, strategies for balancing power between nations, mechanisms for adapting to rapid technological change, approaches to managing trade-offs between transparency and security, incentives for participation, and effective enforcement mechanisms.

Akash R. Wasil, Joshua Clymer, David Krueger et al.

Prominent AI experts have suggested that companies developing high-risk AI systems should be required to show that such systems are safe before they can be developed or deployed. The goal of this paper is to expand on this idea and explore its implications for risk management. We argue that entities developing or deploying high-risk AI systems should be required to present evidence of affirmative safety: a proactive case that their activities keep risks below acceptable thresholds. We begin the paper by highlighting global security risks from AI that have been acknowledged by AI experts and world governments. Next, we briefly describe principles of risk management from other high-risk fields (e.g., nuclear safety). Then, we propose a risk management approach for advanced AI in which model developers must provide evidence that their activities keep certain risks below regulator-set thresholds. As a first step toward understanding what affirmative safety cases should include, we illustrate how certain kinds of technical evidence and operational evidence can support an affirmative safety case. In the technical section, we discuss behavioral evidence (evidence about model outputs), cognitive evidence (evidence about model internals), and developmental evidence (evidence about the training process). In the operational section, we offer examples of organizational practices that could contribute to affirmative safety cases: information security practices, safety culture, and emergency response capacity. Finally, we briefly compare our approach to the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Overall, we hope our work contributes to ongoing discussions about national and global security risks posed by AI and regulatory approaches to address these risks.

Andrea Miotti, Akash Wasil

This paper provides policy recommendations to address threats from deepfakes. First, we provide background information about deepfakes and review the harms they pose. We describe how deepfakes are currently used to proliferate sexual abuse material, commit fraud, manipulate voter behavior, and pose threats to national security. Second, we review previous legislative proposals designed to address deepfakes. Third, we present a comprehensive policy proposal that focuses on addressing multiple parts of the deepfake supply chain. The deepfake supply chain begins with a small number of model developers, model providers, and compute providers, and it expands to include billions of potential deepfake creators. We describe this supply chain in greater detail and describe how entities at each step of the supply chain ought to take reasonable measures to prevent the creation and proliferation of deepfakes. Finally, we address potential counterpoints of our proposal. Overall, deepfakes will present increasingly severe threats to global security and individual liberties. To address these threats, we call on policymakers to enact legislation that addresses multiple parts of the deepfake supply chain.