Ronny Ko

CR
h-index6
3papers
20citations
Novelty23%
AI Score35

3 Papers

CRApr 27
The Beginner's Textbook for Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Ronny Ko

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic scheme that enables computations to be performed directly on encrypted data, as if the data were in plaintext. After all computations are performed on the encrypted data, it can be decrypted to reveal the result. The decrypted value matches the result that would have been obtained if the same computations were applied to the plaintext data. FHE supports basic operations such as addition and multiplication on encrypted numbers. Using these fundamental operations, more complex computations can be constructed, including subtraction, division, logic gates (e.g., AND, OR, XOR, NAND, MUX), and even advanced mathematical functions such as ReLU, sigmoid, and trigonometric functions (e.g., sin, cos). These functions can be implemented either as exact formulas or as approximations, depending on the trade-off between computational efficiency and accuracy. FHE enables privacy-preserving machine learning by allowing a server to process the client's data in its encrypted form through an ML model. With FHE, the server learns neither the plaintext version of the input features nor the inference results. Only the client, using their secret key, can decrypt and access the results at the end of the service protocol. FHE can also be applied to confidential blockchain services, ensuring that sensitive data in smart contracts remains encrypted and confidential while maintaining the transparency and integrity of the execution process. Other applications of FHE include secure outsourcing of data analytics, encrypted database queries, privacy-preserving searches, efficient multi-party computation for digital signatures, and more. A dynamic website version is available at (https://fhetextbook.github.io). Please report any bugs or errors to the Github issues board.

AIOct 30, 2025
GraphCompliance: Aligning Policy and Context Graphs for LLM-Based Regulatory Compliance

Jiseong Chung, Ronny Ko, Wonchul Yoo et al.

Compliance at web scale poses practical challenges: each request may require a regulatory assessment. Regulatory texts (e.g., the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) are cross-referential and normative, while runtime contexts are expressed in unstructured natural language. This setting motivates us to align semantic information in unstructured text with the structured, normative elements of regulations. To this end, we introduce GraphCompliance, a framework that represents regulatory texts as a Policy Graph and runtime contexts as a Context Graph, and aligns them. In this formulation, the policy graph encodes normative structure and cross-references, whereas the context graph formalizes events as subject-action-object (SAO) and entity-relation triples. This alignment anchors the reasoning of a judge large language model (LLM) in structured information and helps reduce the burden of regulatory interpretation and event parsing, enabling a focus on the core reasoning step. In experiments on 300 GDPR-derived real-world scenarios spanning five evaluation tasks, GraphCompliance yields 4.1-7.2 percentage points (pp) higher micro-F1 than LLM-only and RAG baselines, with fewer under- and over-predictions, resulting in higher recall and lower false positive rates. Ablation studies indicate contributions from each graph component, suggesting that structured representations and a judge LLM are complementary for normative reasoning.

CRMay 28, 2025
Seven Security Challenges That Must be Solved in Cross-domain Multi-agent LLM Systems

Ronny Ko, Jiseong Jeong, Shuyuan Zheng et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into autonomous agents that cooperate across organizational boundaries, enabling joint disaster response, supply-chain optimization, and other tasks that demand decentralized expertise without surrendering data ownership. Yet, cross-domain collaboration shatters the unified trust assumptions behind current alignment and containment techniques. An agent benign in isolation may, when receiving messages from an untrusted peer, leak secrets or violate policy, producing risks driven by emergent multi-agent dynamics rather than classical software bugs. This position paper maps the security agenda for cross-domain multi-agent LLM systems. We introduce seven categories of novel security challenges, for each of which we also present plausible attacks, security evaluation metrics, and future research guidelines.