Robi Rahman

Robi Rahman · harvard, stanford

Compute governance proposals often rely on the assumption that frontier AI training requires large, detectable computing clusters. However, recent advances in distributed training algorithms could allow developers to conduct frontier-scale training on distributed agglomerations of hardware, rather than needing large datacenter facilities. Developers who prefer not to be constrained by regulations may structure their hardware in a manner that evades the registration and monitoring requirements associated with compute governance. Therefore, regulations must be designed to detect and prevent illicit distributed training operations. This paper evaluates the feasibility of such evasion and outlines recommended countermeasures, including whistleblowing, chip tracking, forensic accounting, and memory and compute thresholds for clusters.

Alexander K. Saeri, Jess Graham, Michael Noetel et al.

Artificial intelligence poses many risks, ranging from familiar present-day harms to unprecedented and potentially catastrophic ones. Effective risk management requires prioritization: we must understand which risks are most severe, who is most vulnerable, and who is most responsible for addressing them. We report results from a three-round Delphi study conducted late 2025 with 272 international AI experts. Experts rated 24 AI risks on harm probability and severity, sector and actor vulnerability, actor responsibility, and overall concern. Experts estimated the five most severe harms in the next 5 years were likely to come from dangerous capabilities, competitive dynamics, weapons & cyberattacks (including CBRNE), power centralization, and false information. In a business-as-usual scenario, experts judged 18 of 24 risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes (e.g., more than 1 million deaths or more than USD 100B in financial loss) in the next 5 years (2025-2030). In a scenario where pragmatic mitigations are implemented, experts still judged five risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes: dangerous capabilities, weapons & cyberattacks, environmental harm, inequality & unemployment, and power centralization. All 24 risks were judged as being more than 5% likely to cause catastrophic outcomes. AI users and the general public were judged the most vulnerable to these risks, but experts assigned the highest responsibility for addressing them to general-purpose AI developers and governance actors (including governments, regulators, and standards bodies). Across most risks, experts identified information, finance, and national security as the most vulnerable sectors. These findings can guide AI risk prioritization and clarify expert expectations about who should bear responsibility for mitigation.

Anson Ho, Tamay Besiroglu, Ege Erdil et al. · harvard, stanford

We investigate the rate at which algorithms for pre-training language models have improved since the advent of deep learning. Using a dataset of over 200 language model evaluations on Wikitext and Penn Treebank spanning 2012-2023, we find that the compute required to reach a set performance threshold has halved approximately every 8 months, with a 95% confidence interval of around 5 to 14 months, substantially faster than hardware gains per Moore's Law. We estimate augmented scaling laws, which enable us to quantify algorithmic progress and determine the relative contributions of scaling models versus innovations in training algorithms. Despite the rapid pace of algorithmic progress and the development of new architectures such as the transformer, our analysis reveals that the increase in compute made an even larger contribution to overall performance improvements over this time period. Though limited by noisy benchmark data, our analysis quantifies the rapid progress in language modeling, shedding light on the relative contributions from compute and algorithms.

Konstantin F. Pilz, James Sanders, Robi Rahman et al. · harvard, stanford

Frontier AI development relies on powerful AI supercomputers, yet analysis of these systems is limited. We create a dataset of 500 AI supercomputers from 2019 to 2025 and analyze key trends in performance, power needs, hardware cost, ownership, and global distribution. We find that the computational performance of AI supercomputers has doubled every nine months, while hardware acquisition cost and power needs both doubled every year. The leading system in March 2025, xAI's Colossus, used 200,000 AI chips, had a hardware cost of \$7B, and required 300 MW of power, as much as 250,000 households. As AI supercomputers evolved from tools for science to industrial machines, companies rapidly expanded their share of total AI supercomputer performance, while the share of governments and academia diminished. Globally, the United States accounts for about 75% of total performance in our dataset, with China in second place at 15%. If the observed trends continue, the leading AI supercomputer in 2030 will achieve $2\times10^{22}$ 16-bit FLOP/s, use two million AI chips, have a hardware cost of \$200 billion, and require 9 GW of power. Our analysis provides visibility into the AI supercomputer landscape, allowing policymakers to assess key AI trends like resource needs, ownership, and national competitiveness.