Ashwin Gerard Colaco

Ashwin Gerard Colaco, Nada Lahjouji

Large language models, and the agents built on them, spend an ever-growing share of their compute and memory on remembering: caching attention keys and values, carrying long prompts, maintaining recurrent state, and storing what happened in previous turns and sessions. Because none of this memory is free, four largely separate research communities have each learned to compact it. They evict or quantize the KV cache, prune or distill prompts, bound architectural state, and consolidate agent memory. We argue that these are instances of one problem: a rate--distortion decision about what context-derived information to retain versus discard, at what fidelity, under a resource budget, so as to preserve downstream task utility. We make this lens precise with a single compaction objective and a layer-agnostic lower bound, use it to build a seven-axis taxonomy that classifies methods from across the stack uniformly, and use it to transfer mechanisms between layers that have never been connected, from serving-stack KV management to agent long-term memory. Two patterns hold across the survey. At every layer the signal that decides what to keep is attention magnitude or recency, and it fails in the same way everywhere, by discarding, before the query is known and with no way to undo it, information the query later needs. And while compression is measured carefully on single-turn long context, the repeated compaction that agents actually perform is almost never measured, and no benchmark holds one budget axis across all the layers at once. We turn both observations into a benchmark proposal, a small reference experiment, and a set of compaction-aware design principles, and we map the open problems.

Nada Lahjouji, Ashwin Gerard Colaco

Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf. As they move from answering questions to operating over sensitive data, privacy becomes harder to enforce. An agent touches many data sources, runs multi-step workflows, keeps state across sessions, and acts with delegated permissions. Sensitive information can therefore leak not only through its final answer but through the queries it issues, the intermediate results it handles, the memory it writes, and the messages it exchanges with other agents. We survey the privacy of LLM agents from a data-centric view, organizing the field around the data an agent touches rather than by attack type, and we use data agent as shorthand for an LLM agent that works with data. Research on these risks is active but scattered across retrieval-augmented generation, text-to-SQL interfaces, agent memory, prompt injection, access control, and contextual privacy. This survey brings that work together: we taxonomize the data sources an agent touches, the privacy risks each source creates, and the governance mechanisms that address them; we map the benchmarks used to measure these risks and identify what is missing; and we set out the open problems. Two findings recur: among governance mechanisms only information-flow control covers both compositional and cross-session inference leakage, the two least-protected risks; and no benchmark drives an agent across its data surfaces under one privacy policy, the instrument the field most lacks. Our goal is a reference that situates the scattered literature and gives future work a common framing.