Christopher En

Eric Balkanski, Christopher En, Yuri Faenza

The assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1971), is a classic model for two-sided matching markets between buyers and sellers. In the original assignment game, it is assumed that payments lead to transferable utility and that buyers have unit-demand valuations for items. Two important and mostly independent lines of work have studied more general settings with imperfectly transferable utility and gross substitutes valuations. Multiple efficient algorithms have been proposed for computing a competitive equilibrium, the standard solution concept in assignment games, in these two settings. Our main result is an efficient algorithm for computing competitive equilibria in a setting with both imperfectly transferable utility and gross substitutes valuations. Our algorithm combines augmenting tree techniques from maximum matching and algorithms for matroid intersection. We also show that, in two mild generalizations of our model, computing a competitive equilibrium is NP-hard.

Christopher En, Yuri Faenza, Andrea Lodi et al.

We study the problem of fair online resource allocation, motivated by applications such as refugee resettlement and airline scheduling, where agents arrive sequentially and must be assigned to facilities with limited capacities. We introduce a model that maximizes the overall welfare subject to resource constraints and a Lipschitz fairness requirement, which ensures that similar agents arriving in the same batch receive similar expected outcomes. We first analyze the offline problem, proving that the value of the optimal fair allocation is at least an $Ω(1/γ)$ fraction of the optimal unfair allocation, where $γ$ is the fairness coefficient, thereby bounding the price of fairness. For the online setting, we propose an algorithm based on dual mirror descent that enforces fairness constraints within batches while estimating optimal dual variables. We prove that this algorithm achieves sublinear regret relative to the optimal offline fluid benchmark. Finally, we validate our theoretical results using real-world data from the Refugee Economies Programme, demonstrating the algorithm's performance and examining the trade-offs between welfare maximization and fairness enforcement.