Minghao Chen

Hui Zang, Pengfei Xia, Hong Liu et al.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures enable language models to achieve unprecedented scale via sparse activation. However, their inference performance is often limited by data movement bottlenecks. Two coupled challenges exacerbate this limtation: (1) Importance-Agnostic Cost: Low-contribution experts incur nearly uniform memory and transfer costs, resulting in a low cost-to-benefit ratio and wasting critical bandwidth; (2) System-Level Imbalance: Multi-device deployments are universally bottlenecked by the slowest device, meaning that local reductions on one device may yield no improvement in end-to-end latency. We propose Cost-Aware Expert Execution (CAEE), a hardware-guided runtime framework that jointly optimizes for token-level expert importance and system-level execution cost. CAEE uses lightweight, calibrated cost models to estimate hardware overhead, selectively prunes low-importance, high-cost experts, and redistributes their contributions via a low-overhead compensation mechanism, avoiding extra data movement. Evaluations on the 671B DeepSeek-R1 model show that CAEE can reduce end-to-end inference latency by 8\%-18\% across diverse deployment settings, including expert offloading and on-device execution on multi-device systems, while maintaining a model accuracy drop of less than 1\%.

Junhan Li, Yuxin Zhang, Haoran Wang et al.

Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge. Existing methods often rely on rigid explore-then-exploit schedules, assume stationary adversaries, and optimize solely for bidder utility, thereby limiting adaptability and strategic robustness. To address these limitations, we introduce the A3M framework, which integrates adaptive deep reinforcement learning (DRL), explicit adversarial reasoning, and principled multi-objective reward design for online auction strategy optimization. A3M employs an actor-critic DRL backbone to dynamically balance exploration and exploitation, an opponent model for fictitious play against non-stationary adversaries, and a composite reward function to jointly maximize utility, auctioneer revenue, and fairness. We provide the first comprehensive empirical evaluation of this integrated approach against established baselines in both discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Results show that A3M reduces final regret by 30--40\% in standard settings, maintains robust performance against adversarial strategy shifts, scales favorably with the number of units $K$, and enables tunable multi-objective trade-offs. An extensive ablation study confirms the necessity of each core component. Our work establishes A3M as a powerful and flexible framework for learning in complex auction environments.