Jason Jisen Li

2papers

2 Papers

19.0CVJun 28
MotionAtlas: Detailed Region Captioning for Motion-Centric Videos

Weisong Liu, Haochen Wang, Kuan Gao et al.

We propose MotionAtlas, a system for detailed captioning of motion-centric videos, comprising (1) a dedicated human-annotated benchmark, (2) a scalable, high-quality pipeline to construct training samples, and (3) a family of powerful Video-MLLMs. Unlike conventional global motion captioning datasets, we focus on region-aware motion captioning: given a video and a spatiotemporal mask, the model generates precise descriptions of motion within the target region, thereby alleviating visual clutter and motion entanglement and enabling reliable, quantifiable evaluation. Concretely, we first build MotionAtlas-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 2,073 multiple-choice questions, meticulously annotated for a curated set of high-quality, motion-centric videos, to evaluate fine-grained motion understanding of the objects in question. Second, we design a rigorous and scalable data pipeline that leverages self-bootstrap refinement to suppress fine-grained hallucinations, yielding 159k high-quality motion captioning data. Third, we design a tailored training data composition strategy, which achieves consistent and substantial performance gains across diverse baseline Video-MLLMs, including Molmo2 and Qwen3-VL. For instance, MotionAtlas-4B surpasses Qwen3-VL-4B by an average of 5.2 percentage points across general motion benchmarks. The benchmark, dataset, and code have been released.

4.4GTJun 27
Pure Nash Equilibria under the Affine Mechanism: A Potential Game of Exaggeration

Jason Jisen Li, Young Wu, Yancheng Zhu et al.

The mean mechanism is known to be non-incentive-compatible, namely, rational players are incentivized to misreport their values. Despite this game-theoretic issue, the mean mechanism is prevalent in practice due to its other desirable properties. We give a full characterization of pure Nash equilibria--how the players will misreport--for the affine mechanism, of which the mean is a special case. Furthermore, we characterize both complete-information and Bayesian games under the affine mechanism. Our results highlight the inevitability of extreme exaggeration in such games.