Pin-Yu Chen

Ching-Hao Chiu, Hao-Wei Chung, Gelei Xu et al.

With the rapid adoption of generative AI, synthetic medical images pose growing risks, including diagnostic deception and insurance fraud. Although prior work has explored vision-language model (VLM)-based synthetic image detection, these evaluations typically consider images in isolation. In clinical practice, however, images are interpreted alongside structured records and metadata, and VLMs are increasingly deployed under joint image-record inputs. We uncover a previously underexamined multimodal vulnerability: when given both modalities, VLMs may overweight record context in authenticity judgments, such that the same image receives different predictions solely due to changes in its accompanying text. This raises concerns about robustness in real-world deployment. To systematically characterize this effect, we reformulate synthetic medical image detection as an audit of multimodal robustness at the image-record interface and introduce a paired benchmark that holds the image fixed while swapping controlled metadata variants. Across multiple imaging modalities, we evaluate diverse open-weight and frontier API VLMs and quantify how metadata alone shifts authenticity predictions. Our benchmark provides a standardized tool for assessing and improving multimodal robustness beyond image-only settings. The code is available at https://github.com/chiuhaohao/Beyond-Visual-Forensics.

Yan-Lun Chen, Pin-Yu Chen, Chia-Mu Yu et al.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate model outputs through malicious retrieved documents. Existing detection methods typically rely on auxiliary classifiers or additional LLM-based verification, introducing substantial computational overhead. We present TRACE, a lightweight detection framework that identifies poisoning attacks by tracing answer-related tokens through token influence attribution. TRACE first discovers recurrent high-influence keywords across retrieved documents and then performs a secondary verification to confirm their influence on model predictions. Experiments on three QA benchmarks and six LLMs demonstrate strong detection performance while simultaneously uncovering attacker-specified target answers.