Junjie Chen

2papers

2 Papers

10.9CVJun 24Code
Efficient Real-World Dehazing via Physics-Inspired Global-Local Decoupling

Yifei Qu, Ru Li, Junjie Chen et al.

Real-world single image dehazing is highly ill-posed due to spatially and spectrally varying scattering, while practical deployment demands lightweight and low-latency models. Existing approaches either rely on fragile physical inversion under simplified assumptions or adopt heavy blind architectures unsuitable for edge deployment. To overcome these limitations, we propose PGL-Net (Physics-Inspired Global-Local Decoupling Network), a lightweight framework that incorporates physical inductive biases via operator-level emulation, avoiding explicit parameter estimation. It decouples dehazing into global distribution rectification and local structural refinement. A Physics-Inspired Affine Fusion (PAF) module performs globally conditioned alignment across hierarchical skip connections to compensate for haze-induced bias, while a compact Degradation-Aware Modulation (DAM) block adaptively restores spatially and spectrally variant details through dynamic feature modulation. Extensive experiments on multiple real-world benchmarks demonstrate that PGL-Net achieves state-of-the-art restoration quality with significantly reduced complexity. Compared with the recent SOTA SGDN, the Tiny variant (PGL-Net-T) improves PSNR by up to 2.6dB and consistently enhances downstream object detection accuracy, while achieving over a 10x reduction in inference latency. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/sc-30-bit/PGL-Net.

3.0GTJun 24
Envy-free Contracts with Subsidies

Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Yingkai Li

We study algorithmic fair contract design, where a principal designs task-level contracts and fairly delegates a set of tasks to a set of agents. Prior work on this setting, particularly on envy-free (EF) contracts, either suffers from an unbounded price of fairness (PoF) or avoids this unboundedness by losing strict fairness. To address these limitations, we propose a novel scheme, called {\it Envy-free Contracts with Subsidies} (EFS), in which the principal may additionally offer agent-specific subsidies. We show that EFS contracts not only restore strict fairness, but can also outperform EF contracts by an arbitrarily large factor. Moreover, in sharp contrast to EF contracts, we prove that EFS contracts admit a tight $n^{Θ(n)}$ bound on the price of fairness, where $n$ is the number of agents. We further show that computing optimal EFS contracts is NP-hard in general. Nevertheless, when the number of tasks is constant, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing optimal EFS contracts.