Shuohan Wu

Yuhan Jin, Shuohan Wu, Chong Chen et al.

The Internet is transitioning from Web3 toward Web4, where autonomous agents serve as independent economic actors. These agents can now hold crypto wallets, execute on-chain trades, and pay for external API calls. This transition calls for a new infrastructure stack capable of supporting key agent operations, including agent-to-tool interaction, agent-to-agent payments, and verifiable agent identity, represented by emerging protocols such as the Model Context Protocol, x402, and EIP-8004. Despite growing industrial interest in these protocols, the real-world Web4 agent ecosystem remains largely underexplored. To bridge this gap, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of the Web4 ecosystem. Specifically, our study targets three interconnected questions: how Web4 agents are deployed and used in practice; what engineering challenges developers face when building Web4 agents; how current project communities respond to these challenges. To answer these questions, we analyze 99,448 multi-chain identity registrations, 317,596,323 transaction logs, the source code of 341 MCP projects, and 349 filtered GitHub issues. Our findings reveal that autonomous agents have established a highly active machine-to-machine payment economy, processing millions of daily transactions. However, this growth is built on immature infrastructure, including identity/authorization practice, cross-environment operation, and payment interoperability. Our follow-up analysis shows that community responses are visible but unevenly distributed across repositories, and payment interoperability remains the most persistent unresolved bottleneck. Overall, this study reveals a critical gap between the rapid growth of the Web4 agent economy and its fragile underlying infrastructure, highlighting future directions for building a more secure Web4 agent ecosystem.

Yiming Shen, Yuhan Jin, Shuohan Wu et al.

Polymarket has emerged as a prominent prediction market platform and one of the fastest-growing applications in DeFi. To achieve low-latency trading, it adopts a hybrid architecture that matches orders off-chain but settles them on-chain for final execution. This design creates a consistency gap we call Ghost Fills: an order that is successfully matched off-chain may later fail during on-chain settlement. To understand the security implications of this gap, we investigate such failed settlements by building GHOSTHUNTER, which reconstructs them from on-chain traces and attributes to concrete attack patterns. Across 1,952,440 reverted match-order transactions, we find that attackers exploit the time gap between matching and settlement to invalidate already matched orders before they are finalized on-chain. We then identify four attack vectors from these incidents: nonce bump, balance drain, allowance revoke, and proxy trap, realized via 35 evolving variants. These vectors allow attackers to selectively revert 980,133 filled orders, enabling risk-free prediction, arbitrage-bot hunting, and liquidity reward manipulation, realizing at least \$1.49M in profit, which places \$1.78 B USD at risk and 2.17 M POL (about \$212 K) paid by operator. During peak hours, more than 24.3% of all filled orders reverted, causing de facto DoS attacks. We also find that code derived from the flawed contract still appears in 167 independent contracts across 10 chains holding at least \$23 M in user funds, extending the impact beyond Polymarket. We have disclosed our evidence to affected parties, and the issue has been partially mitigated.