Bert de Vries

Raphaël Trésor, Thijs van de Laar, Bert de Vries

Maximum entropy, Bayesian updating, and exponential-family estimation are all instances of a common inference principle: selecting the measure or distribution that minimizes a divergence subject to the available constraints. Which divergence to use is usually decided by analytic convenience, by empirical performance, or by a set of axioms chosen to single it out, leaving open a basic question: why one divergence and not another? We answer it from a single requirement: an inference method should return the same answer whenever the same problem is presented in an equivalent form, for instance, after simply renaming its parts. This requirement alone forces inference to be the minimisation of a classical divergence, and each further reformulation it must respect tightens the admissible family one notch, narrowing the broad f-divergences to the α-divergences and finally to the single Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Mathematically, inference is recast from minimising a numerical functional to selecting a least element under a preorder on positive measures, a divergence being merely one numerical scale that reproduces that preorder. The reformulations are the morphisms of a category of inference problems, and the invariance requirement says the inference operator is a covariant functor into the category of statistical models of Cencov, mirroring his characterisation of the Fisher metric. The representation is proved on finite spaces and lifted to general measurable spaces by an elementary closure, covering discrete and continuous spaces alike. Earlier axiomatisations, such as those of Shore-Johnson and Csiszar, postulate their consistency axioms directly and only on finite alphabets; here the axioms follow from reformulation invariance alone.

Wouter W. L. Nuijten, Thijs van de Laar, Bert de Vries

Planning under uncertainty requires agents to balance goal achievement with information gathering. Active inference addresses this through the Expected Free Energy (EFE), a cost function that unifies instrumental and epistemic objectives. However, existing EFE-based methods typically employ specialized optimization procedures that are difficult to extend or analyze. In this paper, we show that EFE-based planning can be formulated as Variational Free Energy minimization on a generative model augmented with epistemic priors. Our main result demonstrates that minimizing a Variational Free Energy functional with appropriately chosen priors yields a decomposition into expected plan costs (the EFE) plus a complexity term. This formulation reinforces theoretical consistency with the Free Energy Principle by casting planning as the same inferential process that governs perception and learning. We validate our approach on three environments of increasing complexity: a deterministic T-maze, a stochastic Reactivity Maze, and a partially observable MiniGrid DoorKey-8x8 environment. The experiments demonstrate that the epistemic priors induce information-seeking behavior, that the variational formulation yields policy-based inference outperforming plan-based methods under stochastic transitions, and that temporal factorization enables scalability to environments where existing tabular active inference methods cannot operate.