Xuesong Li

Pengxiao Han, Changkun Ye, Yanshuo Wang et al.

Vision-language models like Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) have been extensively studied in data-scarce scenarios. A particularly challenging and realistic task in this area is online zero-shot learning with CLIP, where unknown test samples are predicted sequentially in random order by CLIP while keeping the feature extraction and model parameters fixed during the sequential inference phase. Most existing approaches in this setting address the problem by adapting representations online using incoming test samples, while neglecting the distribution of the data on which CLIP was initially trained. This mismatch can lead to degraded performance when the label distribution in the test data differs from that of the training domain. To address this gap, we propose Label Shift Aware (LSA), which formulates the online zero-shot classification task as a domain adaptation problem. Specifically, LSA adapts the predictions computed by CLIP, which was trained on an unknown source distribution, to a target distribution using only unlabeled test data, and applies label shift correction to mitigate the mismatch between the source and target domains. The extensive experiments across multiple datasets demonstrate that the proposed LSA consistently outperforms state-of-the-art online zero-shot learning methods based on CLIP.

Xukun Luan, Jinyan Liu, Xuesong Li et al.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models enable end-to-end robot control and have garnered widespread attention. However, the memorization of training data inherent to VLA, coupled with the high cost of robotic data acquisition, raises serious concerns regarding data privacy leakage and intellectual property infringement. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a given sample belongs to the training set. While representing a significant privacy threat, this attack remains underexplored in the context of VLA models. To bridge this gap, we propose VLALeaks, which is based on attention discrepancies in VLA models. We reveal, for the first time, the privacy vulnerabilities of VLA models. Specifically, it comprises a two-stage process: (1) membership feature extraction, and (2) attack model construction. Experimental results across multiple VLA benchmarks demonstrate that VLALeaks readily reveals membership information and achieves optimal attack AUC and TPR@1\%FPR, highlighting the privacy vulnerabilities in current VLA model deployments. Our work is the first systematic study of MIAs on VLA models, aiming to provide insights for secure and trustworthy VLA models.