Ousmane Touat

Ousmane Touat, Julian Stier, Pierre-Edouard Portier et al.

A wide variety of generative models for graphs have been proposed. They are used in drug discovery, road networks, neural architecture search, and program synthesis. Generating graphs has theoretical challenges, such as isomorphic representations -- evaluating how well a generative model performs is difficult. Which model to choose depending on the application domain? We extensively study kernel-based metrics on distributions of graph invariants and manifold-based and kernel-based metrics in graph embedding space. Manifold-based metrics outperform kernel-based metrics in embedding space. We use these metrics to compare GraphRNN and GRAN, two well-known generative models for graphs, and unveil the influence of node orderings. It shows the superiority of GRAN over GraphRNN - further, our proposed adaptation of GraphRNN with a depth-first search ordering is effective for small-sized graphs. A guideline on good practices regarding dataset selection and node feature initialization is provided. Our work is accompanied by open-source code and reproducible experiments.

Ousmane Touat, César Sabater, Mohamed Maouche et al.

Dealing simultaneously with confidentiality and Byzantine behaviors in decentralized learning is a challenging problem. Indeed, in decentralized learning, clients train a machine learning model while keeping their data locally and share their model parameters or gradients with a set of neighbors. While enforcing confidentiality calls for hiding the exchanged model parameters/gradients (e.g., by using cryptographic techniques), dealing with Byzantine contributions often requires inspecting the latter. Hence, most research works address these objectives separately. A recent line of work proposes to employ secure multi-party computation (MPC) to implement robust aggregators against model poisoning, thereby enforcing both confidentiality and Byzantine resilience. However, these solutions scale badly: they either require all-to-all communication between participants or delegate the entire computation to a small subset, whose computational and communication load grows proportionally with the size of the network. In this paper, we present Giskard, a protocol for confidential and Byzantine-robust decentralized aggregation. Giskard organizes $n$ parties into a tree of committees of size $O(\log n)$ and evaluates a coordinate-wise approximate median via a committee-adapted distributed binary search over the value domain, using BGW-style MPC within each committee. We assess Giskard both theoretically by proving its security and confidentiality properties and experimentally through extensive experiments involving up to one million participants. Compared to its closest competitors, Giskard reduces per-party communication complexity asymptotically while exhibiting comparable model utility under up to $n/4$ Byzantine parties.

Ousmane Touat, Jezekael Brunon, Yacine Belal et al.

The primary promise of decentralized learning is to allow users to engage in the training of machine learning models in a collaborative manner while keeping their data on their premises and without relying on any central entity. However, this paradigm necessitates the exchange of model parameters or gradients between peers. Such exchanges can be exploited to infer sensitive information about training data, which is achieved through privacy attacks (e.g., Membership Inference Attacks -- MIA). In order to devise effective defense mechanisms, it is important to understand the factors that increase/reduce the vulnerability of a given decentralized learning architecture to MIA. In this study, we extensively explore the vulnerability to MIA of various decentralized learning architectures by varying the graph structure (e.g., number of neighbors), the graph dynamics, and the aggregation strategy, across diverse datasets and data distributions. Our key finding, which to the best of our knowledge we are the first to report, is that the vulnerability to MIA is heavily correlated to (i) the local model mixing strategy performed by each node upon reception of models from neighboring nodes and (ii) the global mixing properties of the communication graph. We illustrate these results experimentally using four datasets and by theoretically analyzing the mixing properties of various decentralized architectures. We also empirically show that enhancing mixing properties is highly beneficial when combined with other privacy-preserving techniques such as Differential Privacy. Our paper draws a set of lessons learned for devising decentralized learning systems that reduce by design the vulnerability to MIA.