Bo Li

4papers

4 Papers

18.4CRJun 11Code
Who Pays the Price? Stakeholder-Centric Prompt Injection Benchmarking for Real-world Web Agents

Zihao Wang, Yiming Li, Yutong Wu et al.

Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences. This makes them vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks, in which seemingly benign content embeds adversarial instructions that manipulate agent behaviour. Existing security benchmarks adopt an \textit{attack-centric} perspective, focusing on the technical feasibility of injections while overlooking the nuanced distribution of resulting harms. In practice, however, prompt-injection risk is victim-dependent: a single exploit can produce asymmetric consequences for different stakeholders, and the same attack pattern may exhibit substantially different effectiveness depending on whom it targets. To capture these properties, we introduce \textbf{\sysname}, a \textit{stakeholder-centric} benchmark to systematically categorize and attribute harm in real-world web agent systems. It distinguishes between affected entities (e.g., user, seller, platform), decomposes the attacks into concrete objectives, and evaluates each case with complementary outcome- and process-level metrics. Our results reveal substantial and heterogeneous vulnerabilities: not a single attack objective is reliably resisted by current agents, and failures distribute across qualitatively distinct modes ranging from \emph{stealthy parasitism} (attack succeeds without disrupting the user's delegated task) to \emph{misaligned disruption} (task disrupted without attack success) and \emph{compounded failure} (both adversarial objective and task integrity simultaneously violated). These patterns are missed by conventional evaluation, highlighting the need for stakeholder-aware assessment of LLM-based agents in real-world deployments. Benchmark is available at https://github.com/StakeBench/SBC.

7.0GTJun 11
Approximate Maximin Share with Subjective Divisibility: Beating the 1/2 Barrier

Xiaohui Bei, Ke Ding, Bo Li et al.

Maximin share (MMS) stands out as a central notion in fair resource allocation. It is known that exact MMS fairness is not always attainable, especially when agents differ along two dimensions: their valuations and their perceptions of the divisibility of resources. The former case with heterogeneous valuations has been widely studied in the literature. The latter, referred to as subjective divisibility by Bei et al., [Games Econ. Behav. 2025], remains much less explored. We study MMS approximation under subjective divisibility. First, we prove that even in the unary valuation setting, where all items have equal value, the optimal approximation ratio is 2/3. This result is somewhat surprising since in the objective setting, even when agents have heterogeneous valuations, the best possible approximation ratio is at least 7/9 [Huang and Zhou, 2025]. We then address the general case with both valuation heterogeneity and subjective divisibility. Previous work shows the existence of a 1/2-approximate MMS allocation. In this paper, we develop new algorithmic techniques that overcome the difficulties posed by subjective divisibility, and improve the approximation guarantee to 5/9. Finally, we complement this result with small-agent cases. For up to four agents, we give polynomial-time algorithms that compute 2/3-approximate MMS fair allocations. These bounds are tight. Our results deepen the understanding of MMS fairness under heterogeneous valuations and subjective divisibility, and provide a new perspective for this emerging model.

10.1LGJun 11
Is Spurious Correlation Removal Always Learnable?

Yibo Zhou, Bo Li, Hai-Miao Hu et al.

Invariant learning can fail even when the invariant structure is statistically identifiable. We show a conditional computational barrier: under a black-box samplable supervised sparse recovery primitive motivated by average-case sparse-recovery reductions, there exist \emph{samplable} multi-environment instances with a one-dimensional predictive invariant subspace ($k=1$) that are learnable with polynomial samples by exhaustive search, while any polynomial-time constant-accuracy recovery algorithm would contradict the primitive. We further quantify environment diversity by a separation parameter $γ$, which controls identifiability and the curvature of invariance objectives. Under sufficient diversity and local Gaussian regularity, the minimax risk is $\mathbb{E}[\dist(\hat{V},V_{\mathrm{inv}})^2]=Θ(k(d-k)/(n|\mathcal{E}|))$, and under label-induced shifts a phase transition occurs at $n^*\propto k(d-k)/(|\mathcal{E}|γ^2)$ with refined estimation error scaling proportional to $1/γ^2$. Synthetic and real datasets illustrate the predicted gaps and transitions and motivate simple diversity diagnostics.

12.7CRJun 11
MAStrike: Shapley-Guided Collusive Red-Teaming on Multi-Agent Systems

Chejian Xu, Zhaorun Chen, Jingyang Zhang et al.

Hierarchical multi-agent systems (MAS) are rapidly being deployed in high-stakes workflows across domains such as finance and software engineering. In these systems, safety and security are inherently distributed across role-specialized agents, significantly expanding the attack surface, particularly under coordinated adversarial behaviors such as privilege escalation and cross-agent collusion. Existing red-teaming approaches for MAS remain limited: they rely on heuristic selection of target agents and perturb isolated message streams, leaving critical questions unanswered as which agents are most responsible for system safety, and how compromised agents can coordinate to bypass defenses. We propose MAStrike, a closed-loop framework for collusive red-teaming in hierarchical MAS. We propose the first agent-level Shapley value analysis for MAS, quantifying each agent's marginal contribution to system robustness under task-specific distributions. GGuided by this attribution, MAStrike identifies vulnerable agent coalitions and generates coordinated, role-aware adversarial manipulations. These attacks are iteratively refined through structured causal diagnosis, attributing failure cases to uncompromised agents that block adversarial attempts. We further build a comprehensive MAS red-teaming benchmark and controllable environments spanning diverse hierarchical topologies and domains, including finance, software engineering, and CRM. Extensive experiments across MAS built on multiple frontier models show that MAStrike substantially outperforms heuristic baselines. Our analysis further uncovers non-trivial Shapley value distributions and higher-order interaction structures among agents, revealing critical vulnerabilities and coordination patterns that are overlooked by prior single-agent or template-based methods.