Shuai Wang

Zimo Ji, Congying Xu, Zongjie Li et al.

LLM coding agents increasingly rely on third-party agent skills from public marketplaces, which execute with the agent's privileges and create a software supply-chain attack surface: a malicious skill can steal credentials, exfiltrate source code, or install backdoors. Existing defenses use static skill scanners based on pattern matching or LLM-as-judge analysis, but it remains unclear whether they withstand adaptive evasions that preserve malicious behavior while changing payload appearance. This paper first presents an adversarial study of existing skill scanners through SkillCloak, a payload-preserving evasion framework that keeps the attack semantics intact while transforming their visible form. SkillCloak uses two complementary strategies: Structural Obfuscation, which rewrites visible payload indicators into semantically equivalent forms, and Self-Extracting Skill (SFS) Packing, which hides malicious components from the install-time view and restores them during agent execution. Across eight scanners and 1,613 in-the-wild malicious skills, SFS Packing bypasses every scanner at over 90%, while Structural Obfuscation bypasses over 80% on most static scanners and reaches 96% on a hybrid scanner, showing that appearance-based auditing is insufficient. Motivated by this finding, we propose SkillDetonate, a behavior-centric runtime auditor that executes skills in a sandbox and detects malicious effects through OS-boundary information-flow evidence rather than install-time appearance. SkillDetonate combines on-demand closure lift, which observes instructions materialized during execution, with marker-based taint analysis, which tracks sensitive-data flows across the agent context, files, processes, and network operations. The results show that SkillDetonate detects 97% of attacks at a 2% false-positive rate and sustains 87% detection on real-world malicious skills.

Xuanyu Chen, Nan Yang, Shuai Wang et al.

Recent research has introduced distributed self-supervised learning (D-SSL) approaches to leverage vast amounts of unlabeled decentralized data. However, D-SSL faces the critical challenge of data heterogeneity, and there is limited theoretical understanding of how different D-SSL frameworks respond to this challenge. To fill this gap, we present a rigorous theoretical analysis of the robustness of D-SSL frameworks under non-IID (non-independent and identically distributed) settings. Our results show that pre-training with Masked Image Modeling (MIM) is inherently more robust to heterogeneous data than Contrastive Learning (CL), and that the robustness of decentralized SSL increases with average network connectivity, implying that federated learning (FL) is no less robust than decentralized learning (DecL). These findings provide a solid theoretical foundation for guiding the design of future D-SSL algorithms. To further illustrate the practical implications of our theory, we introduce MAR loss, a refinement of the MIM objective with local-to-global alignment regularization. Extensive experiments across model architectures and distributed settings validate our theoretical insights, and additionally confirm the effectiveness of MAR loss as an application of our analysis.

Ling Xu, Chuyu Han, Borui Li et al.

Embodied AI models now span vision-language-action (VLA) models and world-action models (WAMs), but practical deployment remains fragmented across model-specific Python stacks, backend assumptions, and robot-side glue code, especially on heterogeneous edge devices. Existing inference runtimes are designed mainly for request-response serving and therefore do not satisfy the runtime contract of embodied deployment: multi-rate execution inside closed-loop control, latency-first batch-1 inference on heterogeneous hardware, and extensible embodied interfaces beyond fixed token I/O. We present Embodied.cpp, a portable C++ inference runtime for embodied models. Based on an architectural analysis of representative VLA models and WAMs, Embodied.cpp captures a shared execution path and organizes it into five layers: input adapters, sequence builders, backbone execution, head plugins, and deployment adapters. The runtime provides modular multi-rate execution, latency-first fused inference, and extensible operator and I/O support, enabling deployment across heterogeneous devices, robots, and simulators through one backend abstraction. We evaluate Embodied.cpp on two VLA models, HY-VLA and pi0.5, and on a preliminary WAM benchmark using a LingBot-VA Transformer block. The VLA deployments achieve successful closed-loop execution with 100.0% and 91.0% task success rates, respectively. The WAM benchmark reduces block memory from 312.2 MiB to 88.1 MiB. These results show that Embodied.cpp improves deployment efficiency while preserving high accuracy across diverse embodied model architectures.

Zimo Ji, Zekai Zhang, Congying Xu et al.

LLM coding agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously on real production infrastructure. They execute shell commands, modify repositories, and call operational APIs. However, completing a task is not sufficient for safety. A wrong action can cause severe consequences. Existing agent benchmarks largely emphasize task completion, leaving open how agents behave under benign but underspecified instructions. We present UnderSpecBench, a benchmark for measuring action-boundary violations in coding agents (i.e., Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode) on DevOps tasks. UnderSpecBench includes 69 task families grounded in documented incidents, CVEs, or tool behavior and organized across four DevOps capability domains and nine operational control surfaces. To isolate underspecification from task difficulty, each task keeps the same environment and ground-truth safe action while varying the instruction along three axes: intent clarity, target certainty, and blast radius. The resulting 2,208 prompt variants are evaluated with deterministic, side-effect-based oracles that separate Safe Success, Wrong Target, and OverScope outcomes; non-action runs are further classified as clarification, refusal, or deferment. Across five agent x model configurations using OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex, the evaluation results show that underspecification does not mainly make agents fail; it makes them guess. 55.8-67.8% of runs violate at least one boundary. Target underspecification sharply degrades action quality, while blast-radius cues barely reduce action propensity. These findings show that completion-centric evaluation can overstate safe autonomy and motivate mitigations at the model, harness, and system layer.