Cristian-Alexandru Staicu

Hossein Hajipour, Ning Yu, Cristian-Alexandru Staicu et al.

Large code datasets have become increasingly accessible for pre-training source code models. However, for the fine-tuning phase, obtaining representative training data that fully covers the code distribution for specific downstream tasks remains challenging due to the task-specific nature and limited labeling resources. Moreover, fine-tuning pretrained models can result in forgetting previously acquired pre-training knowledge. These lead to out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization issues with unexpected model inference behaviors that have not been systematically studied yet. In this paper, we contribute the first systematic approach that simulates various OOD scenarios along different dimensions of source code data properties and study the fine-tuned model behaviors in such scenarios. We investigate the behaviors of models under different fine-tuning methodologies, including full fine-tuning and Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning methods. Our comprehensive analysis, conducted on four state-of-the-art pretrained models and applied to two code generation tasks, exposes multiple failure modes attributed to OOD generalization issues. Additionally, our analysis uncovers that LoRA fine-tuning consistently exhibits significantly better OOD generalization performance than full fine-tuning across various scenarios.

Cristian-Alexandru Staicu, Sazzadur Rahaman, Ágnes Kiss et al.

Scripting languages are continuously gaining popularity due to their ease of use and the flourishing software ecosystems that surround them. These languages offer crash and memory safety by design, thus, developers do not need to understand and prevent low-level security issues like the ones plaguing the C code. However, scripting languages often allow native extensions, which are a way for custom C/C++ code to be invoked directly from the high-level language. While this feature promises several benefits such as increased performance or the reuse of legacy code, it can also break the language's guarantees, e.g., crash-safety. In this work, we first provide a comparative analysis of the security risks of native extension APIs in three popular scripting languages. Additionally, we discuss a novel methodology for studying the misuse of the native extension API. We then perform an in-depth study of npm, an ecosystem which is most exposed to threats introduced by native extensions. We show that vulnerabilities in extensions can be exploited in their embedding library by producing reads of uninitialized memory, hard crashes or memory leaks in 33 npm packages, simply by invoking their API with well-crafted inputs. Moreover, we identify six open-source web applications in which such exploits can be deployed remotely by a weak adversary. Finally, we were assigned seven security advisories for the work presented in this paper, most labeled as high severity.

Nikos Vasilakis, Cristian-Alexandru Staicu, Grigoris Ntousakis et al.

Third-party libraries ease the development of large-scale software systems. However, they often execute with significantly more privilege than needed to complete their task. This additional privilege is often exploited at runtime via dynamic compromise, even when these libraries are not actively malicious. Mir addresses this problem by introducing a fine-grained read-write-execute (RWX) permission model at the boundaries of libraries. Every field of an imported library is governed by a set of permissions, which developers can express when importing libraries. To enforce these permissions during program execution, Mir transforms libraries and their context to add runtime checks. As permissions can overwhelm developers, Mir's permission inference generates default permissions by analyzing how libraries are used by their consumers. Applied to 50 popular libraries, Mir's prototype for JavaScript demonstrates that the RWX permission model combines simplicity with power: it is simple enough to automatically infer 99.33% of required permissions, it is expressive enough to defend against 16 real threats, it is efficient enough to be usable in practice (1.93% overhead), and it enables a novel quantification of privilege reduction.

Cristian-Alexandru Staicu, Daniel Schoepe, Musard Balliu et al.

Information flow analysis prevents secret or untrusted data from flowing into public or trusted sinks. Existing mechanisms cover a wide array of options, ranging from lightweight taint analysis to heavyweight information flow control that also considers implicit flows. Dynamic analysis, which is particularly popular for languages such as JavaScript, faces the question whether to invest in analyzing flows caused by not executing a particular branch, so-called hidden implicit flows. This paper addresses the questions how common different kinds of flows are in real-world programs, how important these flows are to enforce security policies, and how costly it is to consider these flows. We address these questions in an empirical study that analyzes 56 real-world JavaScript programs that suffer from various security problems, such as code injection vulnerabilities, denial of service vulnerabilities, memory leaks, and privacy leaks. The study is based on a state-of-the-art dynamic information flow analysis and a formalization of its core. We find that implicit flows are expensive to track in terms of permissiveness, label creep, and runtime overhead. We find a lightweight taint analysis to be sufficient for most of the studied security problems, while for some privacy-related code, observable tracking is sometimes required. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that tracking hidden implicit flows reveals otherwise missed security problems. Our results help security analysts and analysis designers to understand the cost-benefit tradeoffs of information flow analysis and provide empirical evidence that analyzing implicit flows in a cost-effective way is a relevant problem.

Hossein Hajipour, Apratim Bhattacharyya, Cristian-Alexandru Staicu et al.

Automatic program repair holds the potential of dramatically improving the productivity of programmers during the software development process and correctness of software in general. Recent advances in machine learning, deep learning, and NLP have rekindled the hope to eventually fully automate the process of repairing programs. However, previous approaches that aim to predict a single fix are prone to fail due to uncertainty about the true intend of the programmer. Therefore, we propose a generative model that learns a distribution over potential fixes. Our model is formulated as a deep conditional variational autoencoder that can efficiently sample fixes for a given erroneous program. In order to ensure diverse solutions, we propose a novel regularizer that encourages diversity over a semantic embedding space. Our evaluations on common programming errors show for the first time the generation of diverse fixes and strong improvements over the state-of-the-art approaches by fixing up to 45% of the erroneous programs. We additionally show that for the 65% of the repaired programs, our approach was able to generate multiple programs with diverse functionalities.

Markus Zimmermann, Cristian-Alexandru Staicu, Cam Tenny et al.

The popularity of JavaScript has lead to a large ecosystem of third-party packages available via the npm software package registry. The open nature of npm has boosted its growth, providing over 800,000 free and reusable software packages. Unfortunately, this open nature also causes security risks, as evidenced by recent incidents of single packages that broke or attacked software running on millions of computers. This paper studies security risks for users of npm by systematically analyzing dependencies between packages, the maintainers responsible for these packages, and publicly reported security issues. Studying the potential for running vulnerable or malicious code due to third-party dependencies, we find that individual packages could impact large parts of the entire ecosystem. Moreover, a very small number of maintainer accounts could be used to inject malicious code into the majority of all packages, a problem that has been increasing over time. Studying the potential for accidentally using vulnerable code, we find that lack of maintenance causes many packages to depend on vulnerable code, even years after a vulnerability has become public. Our results provide evidence that npm suffers from single points of failure and that unmaintained packages threaten large code bases. We discuss several mitigation techniques, such as trusted maintainers and total first-party security, and analyze their potential effectiveness.