Zhiyuan Wan

Keyu Liang, Zhongxin Liu, Chao Liu et al.

Code search aims to retrieve semantically relevant code snippets for natural language queries. While pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown remarkable performance in this task, they struggle in cross-domain scenarios, often requiring costly fine-tuning or facing performance drops in zero-shot settings. RAPID, which generates synthetic data for model fine-tuning, is currently the only effective method for zero-shot cross-domain code search. Despite its effectiveness, RAPID demands substantial computational resources for fine-tuning and needs to maintain specialized models for each domain, underscoring the need for a zero-shot, fine-tuning-free approach for cross-domain code search. The key to tackling zero-shot cross-domain code search lies in bridging the gaps among domains. In this work, we propose to break the query-code matching process of code search into two simpler tasks: query-comment matching and code-code matching. Our empirical study reveals the strong complementarity among the three matching schemas in zero-shot cross-domain settings, i.e., query-code, query-comment, and code-code matching. Based on the findings, we propose CodeBridge, a zero-shot, fine-tuning-free approach for cross-domain code search. Specifically, CodeBridge uses Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate comments and pseudo-code, then combines query-code, query-comment, and code-code matching via PLM-based similarity scoring and sampling-based fusion. Experimental results show that our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art PLM-based code search approaches, i.e., CoCoSoDa and UniXcoder, by an average of 21.4% and 24.9% in MRR, respectively, across three datasets. Our approach also yields results that are better than or comparable to those of the zero-shot cross-domain code search approach RAPID, which requires costly fine-tuning.

Zhiyuan Wan, Xin Xia, David Lo et al.

Smart contracts have been plagued by security incidents, which resulted in substantial financial losses. Given numerous research efforts in addressing the security issues of smart contracts, we wondered how software practitioners build security into smart contracts in practice. We performed a mixture of qualitative and quantitative studies with 13 interviewees and 156 survey respondents from 35 countries across six continents to understand practitioners' perceptions and practices on smart contract security. Our study uncovers practitioners' motivations and deterrents of smart contract security, as well as how security efforts and strategies fit into the development lifecycle. We also find that blockchain platforms have a statistically significant impact on practitioners' security perceptions and practices of smart contract development. Based on our findings, we highlight future research directions and provide recommendations for practitioners.

Zhiyuan Wan, David Lo, Xin Xia et al.

A container is a group of processes isolated from other groups via distinct kernel namespaces and resource allocation quota. Attacks against containers often leverage kernel exploits through system call interface. In this paper, we present an approach that mines sandboxes for containers. We first explore the behaviors of a container by leveraging automatic testing, and extract the set of system calls accessed during testing. The set of system calls then results as a sandbox of the container. The mined sandbox restricts the container's access to system calls which are not seen during testing and thus reduces the attack surface. In the experiment, our approach requires less than eleven minutes to mine sandbox for each of the containers. The enforcement of mined sandboxes does not impact the regular functionality of a container and incurs low performance overhead.