Jean‐François Laslier

Markus Brill, Jean-François Laslier, Piotr Skowron

We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature on proportional representation. For instance, we show that Proportional Approval Voting induces the D'Hondt method and that Monroe's rule induces the largest reminder method. We also consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.

Benoit Laslier, Jean-Francois Laslier

The paper deals with the problem of finding the best alternatives on the basis of pairwise comparisons when these comparisons need not be transitive. In this setting, we study a reinforcement urn model. We prove convergence to the optimal solution when reinforcement of a winning alternative occurs each time after considering three random alternatives. The simpler process, which reinforces the winner of a random pair does not always converges: it may cycle.