Abhinav Kumar

Zhen Guo, Abhinav Kumar, Reza Tourani

Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to neural networks, enabling adversaries to manipulate model outputs on specific inputs, often with devastating consequences, especially in critical applications. While backdoor attacks have been studied in various contexts, little attention has been given to their practicality and persistence in continual learning, particularly in understanding how the continual updates to model parameters, as new data distributions are learned and integrated, impact the effectiveness of these attacks over time. To address this gap, we introduce two persistent backdoor attacks-Blind Task Backdoor and Latent Task Backdoor-each leveraging minimal adversarial influence. Our blind task backdoor subtly alters the loss computation without direct control over the training process, while the latent task backdoor influences only a single task's training, with all other tasks trained benignly. We evaluate these attacks under various configurations, demonstrating their efficacy with static, dynamic, physical, and semantic triggers. Our results show that both attacks consistently achieve high success rates across different continual learning algorithms, while effectively evading state-of-the-art defenses, such as SentiNet and I-BAU.

Chenxi Li, Abhinav Kumar, Zhen Guo et al.

The increasing prominence of deep learning applications and reliance on personalized data underscore the urgent need to address privacy vulnerabilities, particularly Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs). Despite numerous MIA studies, significant knowledge gaps persist, particularly regarding the impact of hidden features (in isolation) on attack efficacy and insufficient justification for the root causes of attacks based on raw data features. In this paper, we aim to address these knowledge gaps by first exploring statistical approaches to identify the most informative neurons and quantifying the significance of the hidden activations from the selected neurons on attack accuracy, in isolation and combination. Additionally, we propose an attack-driven explainable framework by integrating the target and attack models to identify the most influential features of raw data that lead to successful membership inference attacks. Our proposed MIA shows an improvement of up to 26% on state-of-the-art MIA.

Abhinav Kumar, Miguel A. Guirao Aguilera, Reza Tourani et al.

The growing popularity of Machine Learning (ML) has led to its deployment in various sensitive domains, which has resulted in significant research focused on ML security and privacy. However, in some applications, such as Augmented/Virtual Reality, integrity verification of the outsourced ML tasks is more critical--a facet that has not received much attention. Existing solutions, such as multi-party computation and proof-based systems, impose significant computation overhead, which makes them unfit for real-time applications. We propose Fides, a novel framework for real-time integrity validation of ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) inference. Fides features a novel and efficient distillation technique--Greedy Distillation Transfer Learning--that dynamically distills and fine-tunes a space and compute-efficient verification model for verifying the corresponding service model while running inside a trusted execution environment. Fides features a client-side attack detection model that uses statistical analysis and divergence measurements to identify, with a high likelihood, if the service model is under attack. Fides also offers a re-classification functionality that predicts the original class whenever an attack is identified. We devised a generative adversarial network framework for training the attack detection and re-classification models. The evaluation shows that Fides achieves an accuracy of up to 98% for attack detection and 94% for re-classification.

Nexhi Sula, Abhinav Kumar, Jie Hou et al.

With the continued advancement and widespread adoption of machine learning (ML) models across various domains, ensuring user privacy and data security has become a paramount concern. In compliance with data privacy regulations, such as GDPR, a secure machine learning framework should not only grant users the right to request the removal of their contributed data used for model training but also facilitates the elimination of sensitive data fingerprints within machine learning models to mitigate potential attack - a process referred to as machine unlearning. In this study, we present a novel unlearning mechanism designed to effectively remove the impact of specific data samples from a neural network while considering the performance of the unlearned model on the primary task. In achieving this goal, we crafted a novel loss function tailored to eliminate privacy-sensitive information from weights and activation values of the target model by combining target classification loss and membership inference loss. Our adaptable framework can easily incorporate various privacy leakage approximation mechanisms to guide the unlearning process. We provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of our unlearning approach with a theoretical upper-bound analysis through a membership inference mechanism as a proof of concept. Our results showcase the superior performance of our approach in terms of unlearning efficacy and latency as well as the fidelity of the primary task, across four datasets and four deep learning architectures.