Yuan Ma

Xiaoge Zhang, Tao Wang, Chao Yan et al.

Ensuring trustworthiness is fundamental to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) that is considered societally responsible, particularly in cancer diagnostics, where a misdiagnosis can have dire consequences. Current digital pathology AI models lack systematic solutions to address trustworthiness concerns arising from model limitations and data discrepancies between model deployment and development environments. To address this issue, we developed TRUECAM, a framework designed to ensure both data and model trustworthiness in non-small cell lung cancer subtyping with whole-slide images. TRUECAM integrates 1) a spectral-normalized neural Gaussian process for identifying out-of-scope inputs and 2) an ambiguity-guided elimination of tiles to filter out highly ambiguous regions, addressing data trustworthiness, as well as 3) conformal prediction to ensure controlled error rates. We systematically evaluated the framework across multiple large-scale cancer datasets, leveraging both task-specific and foundation models, illustrate that an AI model wrapped with TRUECAM significantly outperforms models that lack such guidance, in terms of classification accuracy, robustness, interpretability, and data efficiency, while also achieving improvements in fairness. These findings highlight TRUECAM as a versatile wrapper framework for digital pathology AI models with diverse architectural designs, promoting their responsible and effective applications in real-world settings.

Yuan Ma, Jiankang Wei, Yilun Lyu et al.

Machine learning systems are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers manipulate model behavior through data tampering or architectural modifications. Traditional backdoor attacks involve injecting malicious samples with specific triggers into the training data, causing the model to produce targeted incorrect outputs in the presence of the corresponding triggers. More sophisticated attacks modify the model's architecture directly, embedding backdoors that are harder to detect as they evade traditional data-based detection methods. However, the drawback of the architectural modification based backdoor attacks is that the trigger must be visible in order to activate the backdoor. To further strengthen the invisibility of the backdoor attacks, a novel backdoor attack method is presented in the paper. To be more specific, this method embeds the backdoor within the model's architecture and has the capability to generate inconspicuous and stealthy triggers. The attack is implemented by modifying pre-trained models, which are then redistributed, thereby posing a potential threat to unsuspecting users. Comprehensive experiments conducted on standard computer vision benchmarks validate the effectiveness of this attack and highlight the stealthiness of its triggers, which remain undetectable through both manual visual inspection and advanced detection tools.