Michael Lampe

Aaron Jaech, Adam Kalai, Adam Lerer et al. · openai

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

Aaron Hurst, Adam Lerer, Adam P. Goucher et al. · openai

GPT-4o is an autoregressive omni model that accepts as input any combination of text, audio, image, and video, and generates any combination of text, audio, and image outputs. It's trained end-to-end across text, vision, and audio, meaning all inputs and outputs are processed by the same neural network. GPT-4o can respond to audio inputs in as little as 232 milliseconds, with an average of 320 milliseconds, which is similar to human response time in conversation. It matches GPT-4 Turbo performance on text in English and code, with significant improvement on text in non-English languages, while also being much faster and 50\% cheaper in the API. GPT-4o is especially better at vision and audio understanding compared to existing models. In line with our commitment to building AI safely and consistent with our voluntary commitments to the White House, we are sharing the GPT-4o System Card, which includes our Preparedness Framework evaluations. In this System Card, we provide a detailed look at GPT-4o's capabilities, limitations, and safety evaluations across multiple categories, focusing on speech-to-speech while also evaluating text and image capabilities, and measures we've implemented to ensure the model is safe and aligned. We also include third-party assessments on dangerous capabilities, as well as discussion of potential societal impacts of GPT-4o's text and vision capabilities.

Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal et al. · berkeley, deepmind

We report the development of GPT-4, a large-scale, multimodal model which can accept image and text inputs and produce text outputs. While less capable than humans in many real-world scenarios, GPT-4 exhibits human-level performance on various professional and academic benchmarks, including passing a simulated bar exam with a score around the top 10% of test takers. GPT-4 is a Transformer-based model pre-trained to predict the next token in a document. The post-training alignment process results in improved performance on measures of factuality and adherence to desired behavior. A core component of this project was developing infrastructure and optimization methods that behave predictably across a wide range of scales. This allowed us to accurately predict some aspects of GPT-4's performance based on models trained with no more than 1/1,000th the compute of GPT-4.

Aaditya Singh, Adam Fry, Adam Perelman et al. · berkeley, mila

This is the system card published alongside the OpenAI GPT-5 launch, August 2025. GPT-5 is a unified system with a smart and fast model that answers most questions, a deeper reasoning model for harder problems, and a real-time router that quickly decides which model to use based on conversation type, complexity, tool needs, and explicit intent (for example, if you say 'think hard about this' in the prompt). The router is continuously trained on real signals, including when users switch models, preference rates for responses, and measured correctness, improving over time. Once usage limits are reached, a mini version of each model handles remaining queries. This system card focuses primarily on gpt-5-thinking and gpt-5-main, while evaluations for other models are available in the appendix. The GPT-5 system not only outperforms previous models on benchmarks and answers questions more quickly, but -- more importantly -- is more useful for real-world queries. We've made significant advances in reducing hallucinations, improving instruction following, and minimizing sycophancy, and have leveled up GPT-5's performance in three of ChatGPT's most common uses: writing, coding, and health. All of the GPT-5 models additionally feature safe-completions, our latest approach to safety training to prevent disallowed content. Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards. While we do not have definitive evidence that this model could meaningfully help a novice to create severe biological harm -- our defined threshold for High capability -- we have chosen to take a precautionary approach.

Lama Ahmad, Sandhini Agarwal, Michael Lampe et al.

Red teaming has emerged as a critical practice in assessing the possible risks of AI models and systems. It aids in the discovery of novel risks, stress testing possible gaps in existing mitigations, enriching existing quantitative safety metrics, facilitating the creation of new safety measurements, and enhancing public trust and the legitimacy of AI risk assessments. This white paper describes OpenAI's work to date in external red teaming and draws some more general conclusions from this work. We describe the design considerations underpinning external red teaming, which include: selecting composition of red team, deciding on access levels, and providing guidance required to conduct red teaming. Additionally, we show outcomes red teaming can enable such as input into risk assessment and automated evaluations. We also describe the limitations of external red teaming, and how it can fit into a broader range of AI model and system evaluations. Through these contributions, we hope that AI developers and deployers, evaluation creators, and policymakers will be able to better design red teaming campaigns and get a deeper look into how external red teaming can fit into model deployment and evaluation processes. These methods are evolving and the value of different methods continues to shift as the ecosystem around red teaming matures and models themselves improve as tools for red teaming.

Jason Phang, Michael Lampe, Lama Ahmad et al.

As AI chatbots see increased adoption and integration into everyday life, questions have been raised about the potential impact of human-like or anthropomorphic AI on users. In this work, we investigate the extent to which interactions with ChatGPT (with a focus on Advanced Voice Mode) may impact users' emotional well-being, behaviors and experiences through two parallel studies. To study the affective use of AI chatbots, we perform large-scale automated analysis of ChatGPT platform usage in a privacy-preserving manner, analyzing over 3 million conversations for affective cues and surveying over 4,000 users on their perceptions of ChatGPT. To investigate whether there is a relationship between model usage and emotional well-being, we conduct an Institutional Review Board (IRB)-approved randomized controlled trial (RCT) on close to 1,000 participants over 28 days, examining changes in their emotional well-being as they interact with ChatGPT under different experimental settings. In both on-platform data analysis and the RCT, we observe that very high usage correlates with increased self-reported indicators of dependence. From our RCT, we find that the impact of voice-based interactions on emotional well-being to be highly nuanced, and influenced by factors such as the user's initial emotional state and total usage duration. Overall, our analysis reveals that a small number of users are responsible for a disproportionate share of the most affective cues.