Lingjie Duan

Xuehe Wang, Lingjie Duan

In today's growing data market, wireless service providers (WSPs) compete severely to attract users by announcing innovative data plans. Two of the most popular innovative data plans are rollover and shared data plans, where the former plan allows a user to keep his unused data quota to next month and the latter plan allows users in a family to share unused data. As a pioneer to provide such data plans, a WSP faces immediate revenue loss from existing users who pay less overage charges due to less data over-usage, but his market share increases gradually by attracting new users and those under the other WSPs. In some countries, WSPs have asymmetric timing for providing such innovative data plans, while some other markets' WSPs have symmetric timing or no planning. This raises the question of why and when the competitive WSPs should offer the new data plans. This paper provides game theoretic modelling and analysis of the WSPs' timing of offering innovative data plans, by considering new user arrival and dynamic user churn between WSPs. Our equilibrium analysis shows that the WSP with small market share prefers to announce the innovative data plan first to attract more users, while the WSP with large market share prefers to announce later to avoid the immediate revenue loss. In a market with many new users, WSPs with similar market shares will offer the data plans simultaneously, but these WSPs facing few new users may not offer any new plan. Perhaps surprisingly, WSPs' profits can decrease with new user number and they may not benefit from the option of innovative data plans. Finally, unlike rollover data plan, we show that the timing of shared data plan further depends on the composition of users.

Shu Hong, Lingjie Duan

In federated learning (FL), clients cooperatively train a global model without revealing their raw data but gradients or parameters, while the local information can still be disclosed from local outputs transmitted to the parameter server. With such privacy concerns, a client may overly add artificial noise to his local updates to compromise the global model training, and we prove the selfish noise adding leads to an infinite price of anarchy (PoA). This paper proposes a novel pricing mechanism to regulate privacy-sensitive clients without verifying their parameter updates, unlike existing privacy mechanisms that assume the server's full knowledge of added noise. Without knowing the ground truth, our mechanism reaches the social optimum to best balance the global training error and privacy loss, according to the difference between a client's updated parameter and all clients' average parameter. We also improve the FL convergence bound by refining the aggregation rule at the server to account for different clients' noise variances. Moreover, we extend our pricing scheme to fit incomplete information of clients' privacy sensitivities, ensuring their truthful type reporting and the system's ex-ante budget balance. Simulations show that our pricing scheme greatly improves the system performance especially when clients have diverse privacy sensitivities.

Shensheng Zheng, Wenhao Yuan, Xuehe Wang et al.

Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a prominent distributed machine learning framework that enables geographically discrete clients to train a global model collaboratively while preserving their privacy-sensitive data. However, due to the non-independent-and-identically-distributed (Non-IID) data generated by heterogeneous clients, the performances of the conventional federated optimization schemes such as FedAvg and its variants deteriorate, requiring the design to adaptively adjust specific model parameters to alleviate the negative influence of heterogeneity. In this paper, by leveraging entropy as a new metric for assessing the degree of system disorder, we propose an adaptive FEDerated learning algorithm based on ENTropy theory (FedEnt) to alleviate the parameter deviation among heterogeneous clients and achieve fast convergence. Nevertheless, given the data disparity and parameter deviation of heterogeneous clients, determining the optimal dynamic learning rate for each client becomes a challenging task as there is no communication among participating clients during the local training epochs. To enable a decentralized learning rate for each participating client, we first introduce the mean-field terms to estimate the components associated with other clients' local parameters. Furthermore, we provide rigorous theoretical analysis on the existence and determination of the mean-field estimators. Based on the mean-field estimators, the closed-form adaptive learning rate for each client is derived by constructing the Hamilton equation. Moreover, the convergence rate of our proposed FedEnt is proved. The extensive experimental results on the real-world datasets (i.e., MNIST, EMNIST-L, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100) show that our FedEnt algorithm surpasses FedAvg and its variants (i.e., FedAdam, FedProx, and FedDyn) under Non-IID settings and achieves a faster convergence rate.

Feng Li, Yuqi Chai, Huan Yang et al.

How to incentivize strategic workers using limited budget is a very fundamental problem for crowdsensing systems; nevertheless, since the sensing abilities of the workers may not always be known as prior knowledge due to the diversities of their sensor devices and behaviors, it is difficult to properly select and pay the unknown workers. Although the uncertainties of the workers can be addressed by the standard Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit (CMAB) framework in existing proposals through a trade-off between exploration and exploitation, we may not have sufficient budget to enable the trade-off among the individual workers, especially when the number of the workers is huge while the budget is limited. Moreover, the standard CMAB usually assumes the workers always stay in the system, whereas the workers may join in or depart from the system over time, such that what we have learnt for an individual worker cannot be applied after the worker leaves. To address the above challenging issues, in this paper, we first propose an off-line Context-Aware CMAB-based Incentive (CACI) mechanism. We innovate in leveraging the exploration-exploitation trade-off in an elaborately partitioned context space instead of the individual workers, to effectively incentivize the massive unknown workers with a very limited budget. We also extend the above basic idea to the on-line setting where unknown workers may join in or depart from the systems dynamically, and propose an on-line version of the CACI mechanism. We perform rigorous theoretical analysis to reveal the upper bounds on the regrets of our CACI mechanisms and to prove their truthfulness and individual rationality, respectively. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real datasets are also conducted to verify the efficacy of our mechanisms.

Hongbo Li, Lingjie Duan

In mobile edge computing (MEC) networks, mobile users generate diverse machine learning tasks dynamically over time. These tasks are typically offloaded to the nearest available edge server, by considering communication and computational efficiency. However, its operation does not ensure that each server specializes in a specific type of tasks and leads to severe overfitting or catastrophic forgetting of previous tasks. To improve the continual learning (CL) performance of online tasks, we are the first to introduce mixture-of-experts (MoE) theory in MEC networks and save MEC operation from the increasing generalization error over time. Our MoE theory treats each MEC server as an expert and dynamically adapts to changes in server availability by considering data transfer and computation time. Unlike existing MoE models designed for offline tasks, ours is tailored for handling continuous streams of tasks in the MEC environment. We introduce an adaptive gating network in MEC to adaptively identify and route newly arrived tasks of unknown data distributions to available experts, enabling each expert to specialize in a specific type of tasks upon convergence. We derived the minimum number of experts required to match each task with a specialized, available expert. Our MoE approach consistently reduces the overall generalization error over time, unlike the traditional MEC approach. Interestingly, when the number of experts is sufficient to ensure convergence, adding more experts delays the convergence time and worsens the generalization error. Finally, we perform extensive experiments on real datasets in deep neural networks (DNNs) to verify our theoretical results.

Hongbo Li, Lingjie Duan

Today mobile users learn and share their traffic observations via crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Waze). Yet such platforms simply cater to selfish users' myopic interests to recommend the shortest path, and do not encourage enough users to travel and learn other paths for future others. Prior studies focus on one-shot congestion games without considering users' information learning, while our work studies how users learn and alter traffic conditions on stochastic paths in a human-in-the-loop manner. Our analysis shows that the myopic routing policy leads to severe under-exploration of stochastic paths. This results in a price of anarchy (PoA) greater than $2$, as compared to the socially optimal policy in minimizing the long-term social cost. Besides, the myopic policy fails to ensure the correct learning convergence about users' traffic hazard beliefs. To address this, we focus on informational (non-monetary) mechanisms as they are easier to implement than pricing. We first show that existing information-hiding mechanisms and deterministic path-recommendation mechanisms in Bayesian persuasion literature do not work with even (\text{PoA}=\infty). Accordingly, we propose a new combined hiding and probabilistic recommendation (CHAR) mechanism to hide all information from a selected user group and provide state-dependent probabilistic recommendations to the other user group. Our CHAR successfully ensures PoA less than (\frac{5}{4}), which cannot be further reduced by any other informational (non-monetary) mechanism. Besides the parallel network, we further extend our analysis and CHAR to more general linear path graphs with multiple intermediate nodes, and we prove that the PoA results remain unchanged. Additionally, we carry out experiments with real-world datasets to further extend our routing graphs and verify the close-to-optimal performance of our CHAR.

Hongbo Li, Lingjie Duan

In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design requires the knowledge of time-varying traffic conditions and it is the users themselves to learn and report past road experiences to the social planner (e.g., Waze or Google Maps). When congestion games meet mobile crowdsourcing, it is critical to incentivize selfish users to explore non-shortest paths in the best exploitation-exploration trade-off. First, we consider a simple but fundamental parallel routing network with one deterministic path and multiple stochastic paths for users with an average arrival probability $λ$. We prove that the current myopic routing policy (widely used in Waze and Google Maps) misses both exploration (when strong hazard belief) and exploitation (when weak hazard belief) as compared to the social optimum. Due to the myopic policy's under-exploration, we prove that the caused price of anarchy (PoA) is larger than \(\frac{1}{1-ρ^{\frac{1}λ}}\), which can be arbitrarily large as discount factor \(ρ\rightarrow1\). To mitigate such huge efficiency loss, we propose a novel selective information disclosure (SID) mechanism: we only reveal the latest traffic information to users when they intend to over-explore stochastic paths upon arrival, while hiding such information when they want to under-explore. We prove that our mechanism successfully reduces PoA to be less than~\(2\). Besides the parallel routing network, we further extend our mechanism and PoA results to any linear path graphs with multiple intermediate nodes.

Yiting Hu, Lingjie Duan

The contextual bandit problem, where agents arrive sequentially with personal contexts and the system adapts its arm allocation decisions accordingly, has recently garnered increasing attention for enabling more personalized outcomes. However, in many healthcare and recommendation applications, agents have private profiles and may misreport their contexts to gain from the system. For example, in adaptive clinical trials, where hospitals sequentially recruit volunteers to test multiple new treatments and adjust plans based on volunteers' reported profiles such as symptoms and interim data, participants may misreport severe side effects like allergy and nausea to avoid perceived suboptimal treatments. We are the first to study this issue of private context misreporting in a stochastic contextual bandit game between the system and non-repeated agents. We show that traditional low-regret algorithms, such as UCB family algorithms and Thompson sampling, fail to ensure truthful reporting and can result in linear regret in the worst case, while traditional truthful algorithms like explore-then-commit (ETC) and $ε$-greedy algorithm incur sublinear but high regret. We propose a mechanism that uses a linear program to ensure truthfulness while minimizing deviation from Thompson sampling, yielding an $O(\ln T)$ frequentist regret. Our numerical experiments further demonstrate strong performance in multiple contexts and across other distribution families.

Shugang Hao, Lingjie Duan

Continual learning (CL) is a new online learning technique over sequentially generated streaming data from different tasks, aiming to maintain a small forgetting loss on previously-learned tasks. Existing work focuses on reducing the forgetting loss under a given task sequence. However, if similar tasks continuously appear to the end time, the forgetting loss is still huge on prior distinct tasks. In practical IoT networks, an autonomous vehicle to sample data and learn different tasks can route and alter the order of task pattern at increased travelling cost. To our best knowledge, we are the first to study how to opportunistically route the testing object and alter the task sequence in CL. We formulate a new optimization problem and prove it NP-hard. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm to achieve approximation ratios of $\frac{3}{2}$ for underparameterized case and $\frac{3}{2} + r^{1-T}$ for overparameterized case, respectively, where $r:=1-\frac{n}{m}$ is a parameter of feature number $m$ and sample number $n$ and $T$ is the task number. Simulation results verify our algorithm's close-to-optimum performance.

Hongbo Li, Lingjie Duan

In modern resource-sharing systems, multiple agents access limited resources with unknown stochastic conditions to perform tasks. When multiple agents access the same resource (arm) simultaneously, they compete for successful usage, leading to contention and reduced rewards. This motivates our study of competitive multi-armed bandit (CMAB) games. In this paper, we study a new N-player K-arm competitive MAB game, where non-myopic players (agents) compete with each other to form diverse private estimations of unknown arms over time. Their possible collisions on same arms and time-varying nature of arm rewards make the policy analysis more involved than existing studies for myopic players. We explicitly analyze the threshold-based structures of social optimum and existing selfish policy, showing that the latter causes prolonged convergence time $Ω(\frac{K}{η^2}\ln({\frac{KN}δ}))$, while socially optimal policy with coordinated communication reduces it to $\mathcal{O}(\frac{K}{Nη^2}\ln{(\frac{K}δ)})$. Based on the comparison, we prove that the competition among selfish players for the best arm can result in an infinite price of anarchy (PoA), indicating an arbitrarily large efficiency loss compared to social optimum. We further prove that no informational (non-monetary) mechanism (including Bayesian persuasion) can reduce the infinite PoA, as the strategic misreporting by non-myopic players undermines such approaches. To address this, we propose a Combined Informational and Side-Payment (CISP) mechanism, which provides socially optimal arm recommendations with proper informational and monetary incentives to players according to their time-varying private beliefs. Our CISP mechanism keeps ex-post budget balanced for social planner and ensures truthful reporting from players, achieving the minimum PoA=1 and same convergence time as social optimum.

Lina Wang, Yunsheng Yuan, Feng Li et al.

In the paradigm of decentralized learning, a group of agents collaborate to learn a global model using a distributed dataset without a central server; nevertheless, it is severely challenged by the heterogeneity of the data distribution across the agents. For example, the data may be distributed non-independently and identically, and even be noised or poisoned. To address these data challenges, we propose ROSS, a novel robust decentralized stochastic learning algorithm based on Shapley values, in this paper. Specifically, in each round, each agent aggregates the cross-gradient information from its neighbors, i.e., the derivatives of its local model with respect to the datasets of its neighbors, to update its local model in a momentum like manner, while we innovate in weighting the derivatives according to their contributions measured by Shapley values. We perform solid theoretical analysis to reveal the linear convergence speedup of our ROSS algorithm. We also verify the efficacy of our algorithm through extensive experiments on public datasets. Our results demonstrate that, in face of the above variety of data challenges, our ROSS algorithm have oblivious advantages over existing state-of-the-art proposals in terms of both convergence and prediction accuracy.

Hongbo Li, Sen Lin, Lingjie Duan et al.

Continual learning (CL) has garnered significant attention because of its ability to adapt to new tasks that arrive over time. Catastrophic forgetting (of old tasks) has been identified as a major issue in CL, as the model adapts to new tasks. The Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model has recently been shown to effectively mitigate catastrophic forgetting in CL, by employing a gating network to sparsify and distribute diverse tasks among multiple experts. However, there is a lack of theoretical analysis of MoE and its impact on the learning performance in CL. This paper provides the first theoretical results to characterize the impact of MoE in CL via the lens of overparameterized linear regression tasks. We establish the benefit of MoE over a single expert by proving that the MoE model can diversify its experts to specialize in different tasks, while its router learns to select the right expert for each task and balance the loads across all experts. Our study further suggests an intriguing fact that the MoE in CL needs to terminate the update of the gating network after sufficient training rounds to attain system convergence, which is not needed in the existing MoE studies that do not consider the continual task arrival. Furthermore, we provide explicit expressions for the expected forgetting and overall generalization error to characterize the benefit of MoE in the learning performance in CL. Interestingly, adding more experts requires additional rounds before convergence, which may not enhance the learning performance. Finally, we conduct experiments on both synthetic and real datasets to extend these insights from linear models to deep neural networks (DNNs), which also shed light on the practical algorithm design for MoE in CL.

Jie Xu, Lingjie Duan, Rui Zhang

Conventional wireless security assumes wireless communications are rightful and aims to protect them against malicious eavesdropping and jamming attacks. However, emerging infrastructure-free mobile communication networks are likely to be illegally used (e.g., by criminals or terrorists) but difficult to be monitored, thus imposing new challenges on the public security. To tackle this issue, this article presents a paradigm shift of wireless security to the surveillance and intervention of infrastructure-free suspicious and malicious wireless communications, by exploiting legitimate eavesdropping and jamming jointly. In particular, {\emph{proactive eavesdropping}} (via jamming) is proposed to intercept and decode information from suspicious communication links for the purpose of inferring their intentions and deciding further measures against them. {\emph{Cognitive jamming}} (via eavesdropping) is also proposed so as to disrupt, disable, and even spoof the targeted malicious wireless communications to achieve various intervention tasks.