Mohammad Javad Amiri

Iliya Mirzaei, Mohammad Javad Amiri

Distributed systems deployed in untrustworthy environments agree on a common transaction order through Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols, and that order has real financial value in many decentralized applications: whoever influences it can profit at other users' expense, a problem known as maximal extractable value (MEV). Mysticeti is a state-of-the-art DAG-based BFT protocol in which many validators propose blocks in parallel, and the total order is derived from the resulting DAG afterward. Mysticeti is the consensus protocol powering Sui, a production blockchain with a market capitalization of roughly $3 billion, and it is widely believed to order transactions fairly, since many validators propose blocks in parallel and committed transactions are re-sorted by gas price before execution. We show this fairness assumption breaks down in practice, and the effect is already present on Sui's live network. First, when vertices of the committed graph are merged into a single total order, blocks from the same round are sorted by validator index, giving lower-indexed validators a permanent head start. In our evaluation on a 13-validator network with no attacker, the lower-indexed side wins same-round ordering about 89% of the time. Second, the gas-price re-sort intended to remove this bias uses a stable sort, so transactions paying equal fees (common at the reference gas price) retain the original biased order, letting an attacker profit without paying extra. Third, a validator can amplify this advantage by choosing when to stay silent, a fully legitimate action that violates no protocol rule; this raises its ordering win rate above 94%. We measure all three exploitations, verify that Mysticeti otherwise remains resilient below the standard Byzantine fault threshold, and propose a simple fix: replace the validator-index tiebreaker with an unpredictable, per-commit random key.

Mohammad Javad Amiri, Joris Duguépéroux, Tristan Allard et al.

Crowdworking platforms provide the opportunity for diverse workers to execute tasks for different requesters. The popularity of the "gig" economy has given rise to independent platforms that provide competing and complementary services. Workers as well as requesters with specific tasks may need to work for or avail from the services of multiple platforms resulting in the rise of multi-platform crowdworking systems. Recently, there has been increasing interest by governmental, legal and social institutions to enforce regulations, such as minimal and maximal work hours, on crowdworking platforms. Platforms within multi-platform crowdworking systems, therefore, need to collaborate to enforce cross-platform regulations. While collaborating to enforce global regulations requires the transparent sharing of information about tasks and their participants, the privacy of all participants needs to be preserved. In this paper, we propose an overall vision exploring the regulation, privacy, and architecture dimensions for the future of work multi-platform crowdworking environments. We then present SEPAR, a multi-platform crowdworking system that enforces a large sub-space of practical global regulations on a set of distributed independent platforms in a privacy-preserving manner. SEPAR, enforces privacy using lightweight and anonymous tokens, while transparency is achieved using fault-tolerant blockchains shared across multiple platforms. The privacy guarantees of SEPAR against covert adversaries are formalized and thoroughly demonstrated, while the experiments reveal the efficiency of SEPAR in terms of performance and scalability.

Victor Zakhary, Mohammad Javad Amiri, Sujaya Maiyya et al.

Permissionless blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc) have shown a wide success in implementing global scale peer-to-peer cryptocurrency systems. In such blockchains, new currency units are generated through the mining process and are used in addition to transaction fees to incentivize miners to maintain the blockchain. Although it is clear how currency units are generated and transacted on, it is unclear how to use the infrastructure of permissionless blockchains to manage other assets than the blockchain's currency units (e.g., cars, houses, etc). In this paper, we propose a global asset management system by unifying permissioned and permissionless blockchains. A governmental permissioned blockchain authenticates the registration of end-user assets through smart contract deployments on a permissionless blockchain. Afterwards, end-users can transact on their assets through smart contract function calls (e.g., sell a car, rent a room in a house, etc). In return, end-users get paid in currency units of the same blockchain or other blockchains through atomic cross-chain transactions and governmental offices receive taxes on these transactions in cryptocurrency units.

Amir Ebrahimifard, Mostafa Khoramabadi Arani, Mohammad Javad Amiri et al.

Validating process model against corresponding requirements is one of the most important problems in domain of collaborative processes. In this paper collaborative processes are modeled using the interaction view of BPMN 2.0 standard. Then, requirements are extracted with a goal modeling technique. Different scenarios of each requirement show possible paths for the system. These paths are modeled by sequence diagram and collaborative processes are validated according to the corresponding requirements using Savara tool.